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NOTES
BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION:
WINNERS IN THE GAME OF LIFE?
O'Brien smiled slightly.... "Did I not tell you just now that
we are different from the persecutors of the past? We are not
content with negative obedience, nor even with the most abject
submission. When finally you surrender to us, it must be of
your own free will. We do not destroy the heretic because he
resists us, so long as he resists us we never destroy him. We
convert him, we capture his inner mind, we reshape him. We
burn all evil and all illusion out of him; we bring him over to our
side, not in appearance, but genuinely, heart and sole .... "I
R. B. F. SKINNER, Harvard's noted professor and psychologist, and
Uperhaps the most famous advocate of "behavior modification,"2
saw the hope of such scientific social engineering as creating a "tech-
nology of behavior"3 in order to effectuate control.
While aspirations to exercise such control of men's minds were some-
what novel, it took only until 1962 for the Bureau of Prisons to become
actively interested in the possibilities. In that year Dr. James V. Bennett,
who was then Director of the United States Bureau of Prisons, presided
over a seminar on corrections which was attended by psychologists and
wardens alike. Dr. Bennett, shared the feeling attributed to many social
scientists that because the federal prison system had control over thou-
sands of prisoners it offered "a tremendous opportunity"' 4 for experimen-
tation. He urged the participants to take the initiative in activating their
own behavior modification programs.
What I am hoping is that the audience here will believe that
we here in Washington are anxious to have you undertake some
'G. ORWELL, 1984, 210 (1961 ed.).
2 N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1974, at 16, col. 1. Cf. TIME MAGAZINE, April 1, 1974, at 5,
where Dr. Skinner indicates that he is given too much credit for many of the programs
developed and that he advocates only those forms of behavior modification which are
based upon positive rewards.
3 B. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY 5 (1971). See also the statement of Dr.
James McConnell, Professor of Psychology of the University of Michigan:
I believe the day has come when we can combine sensory deprivation with
drugs, hypnosis, and astute manipulation of reward and punishment to gain
almost absolute control over an individual's behavior....
Quoted in Mitford, The Torture Cure, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, Aug., 1973, 24-25 [here-
inafter cited as Mitford].
I Mitford at 18, quoting from CoRRECTIVE PsYcHIATRY & J. OF SOCIAL CHANCE, Second
Quarter (1962).
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of these things: do things perhaps on your own - undertake a
little experiment of what you can do with the Muslims, what you
can do with some of the sociopath individuals.5
Just how quickly social scientists and correctional officials would
adopt Dr. Bennett's proposals was unknown. But it is now clear that in
1974, when law suits6 and legislative investigations7 brought behavior
control programs to the public's attention, such programs were wide-
spread, and adherents of behavior control programs were firmly en-
trenched in the bureaucracy of the correctional systems.8
It is because the officials who administer the penal institutions are
firmly committed to "behavior control" as a method of penological re-
form 9 that it is important to consider this "new approach" and all of its
ramifications. It is to that end that this note will consider the extent and
intensity of behavior control programs; the legal ramifications of such
programs; and prospects for the future.
I. BEHAVIOR CONTROL AND BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION
The term behavior control refers to all systematic or scientific en-
deavors in which the goal or result is to use external means to alter a
person's behavior and in which such alteration can be imposed without
regard to the person's wishes. Different types of behavior control in-
clude the use of psychotropic (mind-altering) drugs, electrical stimula-
tion of the brain by the implantation of electrodes, psychosurgery, and
organic conditioning techniques.' 0 The scope of this discussion of be-
havior control will be limited to the last category," which is most often
termed "behavior modification" and which is the type used most exten-
sively in the prison system.' 2
5 Id.
E.g., Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973); Clonce v. Richardson, 379 F.
Supp. 338 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
SUBCOMM. ON COURTS, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE OF THE
HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93d Cong. 2d Sess., INSPECTION OF FEDERAL FACILITIES
AT LEAVENWORTH PENITENTIARY AND THE MEDICAL CENTER FOR FEDERAL PRISONERS
(Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter referred to as REPORT]; Hearing on Oversight Hearing
Behavior Modification Programs in the Federal Bureau of Prisons Before the Subcomm.
on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
E.g., Norman A. Carlson, the director of the federal prison system has told a congres-
sional subcommittee that behavior modification was an "integral part" of many prison
programs and that it would continue to be used on inmates "whenever appropriate."
N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1974, at 38, col. 1.
See generally the statements of Dr. Groder and Dr. Carlson, of the U.S. Bureau of
Prisons, before the Congressional Subcommittee, Hearings, supra note 7.
15 For a summary of what these techniques involve and an introductory biography see
Shapiro, Legislating the Control of Behavior Control: Autonomy and the Corrective Use
of Organic Therapies, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 237, n.3-6 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Shapiro]. A comprehensive analysis of the issues involved in psychosurgery is pre-
sented in Symposium: Psychosurgery, 54 B.U.L.REv. 215 (1974).
I This is not meant to suggest that the discussion herein is not applicable to other forms
of behavior control, only that it does not specifically address itself to those questions.
1I While many of the cases discussed herein are related to the use of drugs, it should be
1975]
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Organic conditioning or behavior modification may be defined as
any attempt to use positive or negative reinforcement in an attempt to
change a person's behavior.1 3  In its more technical sense, it "is the
systematic application of the psychological principles of learning theory
to the process of encouraging people to change their behavior.' 14 (Em-
phasis added.) While similar techniques may be used in a minor way in
a person's ordinary, day-to-day life,' 5 behavior modification is differ-
entiated by the fact that it is "practiced systematically and analytically."'
6
The California Medical Facility at Vacaville provides an example of this
systematic approach. The medical facility houses inmates who have
been convicted of a felony and who have either developed mental illness
subsequent to incarceration or who have been determined by the Cali-
fornia Department of Corrections to have personality or psychological
problems.' 7  One of the special programs conducted at Vacaville until
1970 was "anective treatment. "18 The treatment itself is best de-
scribed by a former patient/prisoner at California's Atascadero State
Hospital:
[Harvey has just refused his nightly Thorazine "cocktail."]
"That's it Harvey," Harrison says. "Remember what I told
you last time. They're just going to have to give you Anectine
again."
noted that they are used either as a form of control or for purposes of aversive conditioning
and therefore are not considered part of the treatment known as drug therapy.
13 See Clairborne, Behavior Modification and Its Positive Aspects, N.Y. Times, April 28,
1974, § 4, at 13, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Behavior Modification].
14 Carlson, Hearings, supra note 7, at 4.
Its basic method of procedure is to arrange contingencies between the patient's
behavior and the consequences of that behavior. A good consequence is
typically referred to as a reward (positive reinforcer), while a bad consequence
is viewed as something that is undesirable (negative reinforcer). The behavioral
therapist is always on the lookout for these two kinds of consequences relative
to a particular patient and purposely structures an environment so that be-
havior becomes the vehicle by which rewards are acquired or undesirable events
terminated.
See Note, Conditioning and Other Technologies Used to "Treat?" 'Rehabilitate?"
"Demolish?" Prisoners and Mental Patients, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 616, 626 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Conditioning] quoting from H. SCHAEFER & P. MARTIN, BEHAVIOR
THERAPY 5 (1969). Behavior modification may be further subdivided into three
theoretical subcategories: classical conditioning, operant conditioning, and aversion
therapy. Classical conditioning involves "learning" after which a conditioned stimulus
will produce a conditioned response. Classical conditioning thus is concerned with
strengthening or weakening behavior by its antecedents. Operant conditioning takes the
opposite approach and reinforces or punishes conduct after it has occurred. Operant
conditioning focuses upon altering behavior by its consequences. Aversion therapy is
an attempt to cause certain behavior to stop by associating it with unpleasant conse-
quences. It has been suggested that aversion therapy is nothing more than negative
reinforcement under operant conditioning. For a more detailed discussion of these
matters and references to scientific works see generally Conditioning at 628-31. See
also Singer, Psychological Studies of Punishment, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 405 (1970).
IS Behavior Modification, supra note 13, at 13; Carlson, Hearings, supra note 7, at 62.
11 Behavior Modification, supra note 13, at 13, col. 3.
17 For a fuller discussion see Conditioning, supra note 14, at 633-40.
18 The program was discontinued due to both a lack of adequate staff and proper subjects
as well as possible adverse public reaction. Id. at 635.
[Vol. 24:422
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Harvey goes limp. "No Mr. Harrison, don't give me that!"
"I'm sorry, Harv, but you don't give us much choice."
. . . Burns prepares a Thorazine injection . . . [a]nd one
morning soon they will take Harvey downstairs to an examin-
ing room, and strap him to the table. The doctors will drain
Anectine from a vial while technicians wheel an oxygen tank
closer. They will tell Harvey if he had behaved himself they
wouldn't have to do this. The cotton ball will be cold on the tied
vein, the needle inserted before he has time for a full breath or
thought. Paralysis will sweep through him, pounding heart
stilled, lungs unable to draw or burst, attempts at movements
aborted. He will know he is dead as the doctor bends to softly
warn, "Now, Harvey, you won't act up anymore, will you? It
just doesn't pay. You know better than that .... ." And before
unconsciousness, before a blurred hand reaches for the tank,
he'll revive, tingling with frightened life, no wiser from know-
ing the next dose will be larger. 19
The accuracy of this account is substantiated by the statements of
Dr. Arthur Nugent, chief psychiatrist at Vacaville, when he observed that
the Anectine treatment gave the "patient" the feelings of suffocation and
drowning, of terror and horror, and made him feel "as though he were
on the brink of death. '" 20
Originally, sixty-four inmates were selected for the program. Those
selected were considered "angry young men" who were destructive
either to themselves or to other inmates and each "was found either in-
accessible or unamenable to other therapies ... "21 The understand-
ing was that prisoners were to experience "anectine therapy" if they com-
mitted certain prohibited acts which included violent attacks on others,
self-mutiliation, suicide attempts, sniffing toxic substances, or destruc-
tion of property. 22 In all, 15 of the prisoners were finally given the
treatment,23 at least five of them without any semblance of consent. 24
An attempt was made to administer the drug as soon as possible after
the inmate violated one of the prohibitions.
The distinctions between behavior modification as practiced at Vaca-
ville and the "behavior modification" allegedly practiced by everyone in
everyday life25 are readily apparent. Though there is no identity be-
19 Opton, Psychiatric Violence Against Prisoners: Therapy is Punishment, 45 Miss. L. J.
605, 625-26 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Psychiatric Violence] quoting G. LIVINGSTON,
EXILE'S END, 101-02 (1973). Cf. Conditioning, supra note 14, at 635-36 for an account
by a member of the medical staff administering the program.
20 Mitford, supra note 3, at 25-26. For a more detailed account see Conditioning, supra
note 14, at 634-38.
21 Conditioning, supra note 14, at 634.
2 Id.
23 Id. at 635.
24 Id. at 634-35.
2' Hearings, supra note 7, at 62. See also R. BLACKWOOD, THE OPERANT CONTROL OF
MISBEHAVIOR (1970); Gray, Straubard & Rosenberg, Little Brother is Changing You,
PsYcoOLocY TODAY, March, 1974, at 42-46.
1975]
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tween the Vacaville program and other behavior modification programs,
consideration of the objectionable features of the Vacaville program re-
veals five criteria upon which a given program of behavior modification
can be judged.
The first consideration is the degree of "intrusion" into the individ-
ual's life. Such intrusion may be either physical or menta 2 6 and may
include considerations such as a change in the individual's personality
and life-style.
A second criterion is the degree of coerciveness involved. This is
determined by such factors as the extent of physical intrusion involved,
the duration of the effect, any side effects, and the degree to which an
inmate can resist the effects of the technique.
2 7
The third consideration is how "dramatic" the change is. It involves
an attempt to measure the length of time needed for the change to occur,
and the "quantity" of change.
Fourth, the amount of risk must be considered. Risk includes not
only the danger that the technique (or experiment) may fail, but also
the mental or physical damage which the patient might suffer in that
event. Equally as important, consideration must be given to the known or
reasonably anticipated side effects.
Finally, there is the consideration of the ability to reverse the effect
of prior modifications.28 If the individual involved were to change his
mind about the modification, or if a new scientific advance would
demonstrate that a past assumption was incorrect, what would be the
possibilities of restoring the individual to his previous condition?
By utilizing these criteria, one can make distinctions between the
extremes. The "thank you" and smile of a salesclerk while possibly
providing a "positive reinforcement" involves no intrusion into the in-
dividual's life, exerts no coerciveness, does not produce a sudden and dra-
matic change, involves little or no risk to the recipient, and whatever
change it may have induced can be reversed with little trouble. Unfor-
tunately, the same cannot be said for many of the programs instituted
in correctional centers.
A. Example or Abberation?
Is the Vacaville program of "Anectine treatment" representative of
nation-wide experimentation with behavior modification - or only an
unfortunate but since discontinued incident? There is no easy answer to
this question.
One of the major problems in attempting to evaluate behavior modi-
fication and its impact upon society has been that no one possesses an
26 Shapiro, supra note 10, at 251, n.39:
"[I]ntrusiveness" is defined by reference to the effects of a therapy or procedure
upon mentation and behavior rather than by reference to physical invasion of
the person ....
27 Conditioning, supra note 14, at 619.
28 For a discussion of reversability, see Shapiro, supra note 10, at 263-65.
(Vol. 24:422
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accurate picture of the number, contents, or results of such programs.
In February of 1974, a spokesman for the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration (LEAA) estimated that it had funded at least 400 behavior
modification programs, but at the same time admitted that the agency
did not know exactly how many programs it had funded.29 The situation
is further complicated by the fact that behavior modification programs
are funded not only by other federal agencies such as the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW)30 but also by various state and
local governments. 3'
Many of the existing programs may have been terminated on Febru-
ary 15, 1974, when both LEAA and HEW, in response to public and
congressional pressure, announced a ban on the use of funds for programs
involving behavior modification. 32  Nevertheless, since the definition
of what is and is not banned has not been specified and in light of
statements by various federal correctional officials that they will pursue
their programs,33 it seems likely that many or most of the developed
behavior modification programs will continue to exist in one form or an-
other.
Alvin Bronstein of the American Civil Liberties Union estimates
that about twenty states are currently using some form of behavior modi-
fication. 34 In addition to certain federal programs, information is read-
ily accessible concerning the programs conducted in eleven states -
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Wisconsin.
The state of California conducts behavior modification programs in
at least three institutions: the California Medical Facility at Vacaville,
the California Men's Colony, and the California Institute for Women
(CIW). At the California Men's Colony the psychiatric staff uses the
powerful drug Proxilin to control inmate behavior under the "novel diag-
nostic classification" 35 that the prisoners are psychotics who are repress-
ing the symptoms of their psychosis. 36 CIW makes use of an Anectine
29 Celsner, Behavior Control Issue Unsolved, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1974, at 18, col. 1.
30 See N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1974, at 54, col. 2, where it is indicated that HEW, through its
National Institute of Mental Health, is funding several behavior modification programs
dealing with juveniles. But NIMH has subsequently withdrawn its funding of such
programs and has recommended that HEW do the same.
31 See 'Behavior Mod' Behind the Walls, TiME MAGAZINE, March 11, 1974, at 74, for an
account of a program currently being planned by the New England states.
32 N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1974, at 66, col. 1.
33 Hearings, supra note 7, at 56.
34 'Behavior Mod Behind the Walls, TIME MAGAZINE, March 11, 1974, at 75.
35 Psychiatric Violence, supra note 19, at 640.
36 Id. Opton is quoting the following from CIBA FOUNDATION SYMPOSIUM, MEDICAL
CARE OF PsONERS AND DETAINEES, 17 (1973):
The prison officials at this institution [California Men's Colony] . . .have also
created a new classification called "psychotic repression" meaning that the
inmate is psychotic but he is repressing the symptoms of his psychosis .... It
is appatent that the drug [Prolixin] is also used for control purposes - to
undermine resistance and quiet chronic complaints.
1975]
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treatment similar to that used at Vacaville 7 and also conducts an "As-
klepieion" program similar to that developed by Dr. Martin Groder of
the Federal Bureau of Prisons.38
Colorado's program is designed to deal with incorrigible juvenile
delinquents and is said to be run by the juveniles themselves. 39 The
Connecticut program is conducted at the Correctional Institute at Sem-
ers, Connecticut. 40  It is voluntary and includes both hypnosis and shock
treatment for convicted child molesters.4' Until a recent court decision,
Indiana had made extensive use of the drugs Sparine and Thorazine at
the Indiana Boy's School in an effort to "treat" those juveniles who were
thought to be dangerous. 42
Recently, Iowa's use of Apomorphine at the Iowa Security Medical
Facility was declared unconstitutional. 43  The drug was administered as
an "aversive therapy" for infractions such as "not getting up, for giving
cigarettes against order, for talking, for swearing, or for lying."44  The
drug had the effect of inducing vomiting which lasted from fifteen min-
17 Conditioning, supra note 14, at 636-37, 639. See also text accompanying notes 19-26
supra.
31 Psychiatric Violence, supra note 19, at 631.
31 'Behavior Mod' Behind the Walls, TIME MAGAZINE, March 11, 1974, at 75.
40 See generally,' Knight, Child Molester Try 'Shock' Cure, N.Y. Times, May 21, 1974,
at 43, col. 1.
41 The program may be described as follows:
[T]he inmates are taught to associate objects or thoughts they fear - such as
heights, insects, doctors, anything at all - with pictures and thoughts of children.
At the same time, they are taught to associate pleasurable thoughts with pictures
and thoughts of adults. Id.
The electirc shock is administered by a hand-held "black box" - its current of one-half-
a-milliampere at 100 volts being produced by batteries, while the inmate views a slide
of a naked child from a pornographic magazine.
The shock, when felt across the fingertips, produces no pain, but, instead, an
unpleasant, tingling jolt and an immediate desire to withdraw from it. Id. at col. 2.
According to one inmate, "It doesn't hurt, but I hate it." Id. at col. 1. Mr. Wolfe, a
psychologist who administers the treatment believes that it is quite effective:
The immediate effect is unquestionable. It knocks the hell out of their sexual
fantasies and gives them a lot of faith in the technique. But the lasting effects
are unclear. Id.
The initial results of the program reveal that 9 of the 15 repeat offenders who have been
paroled have been "at least temporarily cured after completing the six week therapy
course .... .. Id. Of these 9, the longest had been free for nine months as of May of
1974 and no arrests have been made.
42 See Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974) where the court indicated that it is
"not persuaded . . . that the use of tranquilizing drugs is not 'punishment'."
Experts testified that the tranquilizing drugs administered to the juveniles can
cause: the collapse of the cardiovascular system, the closing of a patient's throat
with consequent asphyxiation, a depressant effect on the production of bone
marrow, jaundice from an affected liver, and drowsiness, hemotological dis-
orders, sore throat and ocular changes. Id. at 357. (Footnote omitted.)
The drug was administered in common situations; for example, when the plaintiff's
"nose began to bleed profusely and he began to vomit and 'holler for help.' " Id. at
356 n.8.
43 Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973). The "therapy" was declared un-
constitutional based on the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amend-
ment.
44 Id. at 1137.
[Vol. 24:422
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utes to an hour.4 5 It also produced temporary alterations in blood pres-
sure and the heart. 46
The Intensive Program Center near Marquett, Michigan, subjects
the prisoner to a "positive" behavior program similar to the federal
Standard Treatment and Rehabilitation Training program (START).4 7
This program begins with solitary confinement and allows inmates to
"earn" better living conditions by their behavior.
48
In Maryland "defective delinquents" 49 are committed to Patuxent
Institution for Defective Delinquents where they are given "treatment"
and are not allowed to leave until they are cured.50  While at one time
Patuxent utilized aversion therapy5' in the form of electroshock,
52 it
currently makes use of a "therapeutic milieu"' in which an inmate gains
privileges as a reward for good behavior. 54
Ohio's participation in behavior modification took place at the
Chillicothe Correctional Institution where drugs were given to inmates
in an effort to alter their "institutional behavior" and the "adjustment
patterns" of sociopaths. 55 Pennsylvania, under an LEAA grant, is pursu-
ing a multi-tiered, positive reinforcement program for juveniles. 56 In
Tennessee, two suits have been filed against the Shelby County Penal
Farm alleging that a prerequisite for participation in a work release
program is the taking of Antabuse, a drug which induces severe and vio-
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 For a discussion of the START program see text accompanying footnotes 76-88.
48 TIME MAGAZINE, March 11, 1974, at 74.
49 A "defective delinquent" is defined in the MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B, § 5 (1971) as
an individual who, by the demonstration of persistent, aggravated, antisocial
or criminal behavior, evidences a propensity toward criminal activity, and who is
found to have either such intellectual or emotional unbalance or both, as to
clearly demonstrate an actual danger to society so as to require such confinement
and treatment, when appropriate, as to make it reasonably safe for society to
terminate the confinement and treatment.
50 Stanford, A Model, Clockwork-Orange Prison, N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1972, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 71, col. 1.
51 See note 14, supra.
52 Stanford, A Model Clockwork-Orange Prison, N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1972, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 72, col. 3. This program was abandoned because of adverse public reaction.
51 Id. at 74, col. 3.
11 Patients were required to attend weekly group therapy sessions. The core of the
program is the "graded-tier" system which "provides rewards for socially acceptable
behavior." Id. at col. 3. There are four tiers. The "patient" begins at the lowest
tier and by his behavior works his way up, gaining more privileges as well as more
obligations and responsibilities. Examples of such rewards are as follows: the fourth-
level patients can stay up as late as they want; third level must be in bed by 11:30;
second level must be in bed by 11:00; only fourth-level men get to have Sunday picnics
with their families or other guests; fourth-level men have pool tables while third-level
men only have ping-pong tables; finally, only those in the third or fourth level are
eligible for parole. Id. at 74-75.
5 N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1974, at 66, col. 1. The Chillicothe Treatment and Research
Center was to close on September 5, 1975 due to space limitations. Cleveland Plain
Dealer, Aug. 16, 1975, § B, at 2, col. 5.
-5 N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1974, at 66, col. 1.
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lent illness whenever a drink of alcohol is taken.5 7  Wisconsin, conducts a
voluntary behavior modification program for sex offenders using .electric
shock.58
While plans for future programs are largely unknown, the Governors
of New England States, in a conference in February of 1974, agreed to
tentatively support plans to build "a new joint facility for 'special of-
fenders' that will depend on behavior modification, including the use of
drugs to control disruptive behavior."
59
The federal government has also been involved in an extensive set of
behavior modification programs. These programs comprehensively are
more organized, and are considered to be less aversely oriented. The
Bureau of Prisons first used formalized behavior modification programs
in 1965 at the National Training School for Boys in Washington, D.C. 60
This program was designed to motivate the juveniles to participate in ed-
ucational programs by offering cash rewards to those who would partic-
ipate in the program.6 1  A similar token economy program was insti-
tuted at the Robert F. Kennedy Youth Center in Morgantown, West
Virginia, when it opened in 1968.62
A second behavior modification program was established at the Fed-
eral Penitentiary in Marion, Illinois in 197263 and was followed by a sim-
ilar program at the Federal Reformatory at El Reno, Oklahoma in July
of 1973.64 According to Dr. Carlson, Director of the Federal Bureau of
Prisons, the behavior modification program consisted of positive rein-
forcement wherein the prisoners earned greater privileges by their im-
proved behavior;65 members of the Federal Prisoners' Coalition who were
placed in a segregation unit for refusing to participate in the program de-
57 Watson v. Hyden, No. C-73-191 (W.D. Tenn., filed May 16, 1973); Shelby County Penal
Farm Inmates v. Hyden, No. 73-192 (W.D. Tenn., filed May 16, 1973). These com-
plaints are summarized as Nos. 10,368, and 10,369 respectively, in 7 CLEARINGHOUSE
REVIEW 232 (August 1973).
58 N.Y. Times, supra note 55, at col. 2. The Times describes the program as a voluntary
one, which gives male inmatcs an "uncomfortable" shuck from a one-and-a-half volt
battery cell. The shock treatment is designed to help the inmates transfer their feelings
of sexual attraction from children to adults.
59 'Behavior Mod' Behind the Walls, TIME MAGAZINE, March 11, 1974 at 75.
60 Hearings, supra note 7, at 4.
61 Under this program they could use the money to purchase extra items such as snacks
and clothing; additionally they were allowed to participate in special recreation such as
pool and ping-pong. Id.
62 Id. at 4-5.
6 Id. at 8. The program was instituted after a "major work stoppage organized by a
group of inmates." According to the prisoners, the program was applied to agitators,
suspected militants, writ-writers, and other trouble makers. Mitford, supra note 3, at 18.
Initially 89 inmates were assigned to the unit. Hearings, supra note 7, at 8. Since
that time, 93 offenders have been released or transferred to other institutions. Id.
The average time in which a prisoner stayed in the control unit was nine months. Id.
64 The program at El Reno was instituted as a response to several "major racial dis-
turbances." Hearings, supra note 7, at 8.
65 According to Dr. Carlson, prisoners in the control units were provided with "the same
basic elements" as the other prisoners, but they were provided "in a closely supervised
and controlled setting." Carlson, Hearings, supra note 7, at 8.
[Vol. 24:422
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scribed it as an attempt to brainwash the participants by Chinese thought
reform methods.
6 6
In an effort to gain perspective on the factual dispute between the Co-
alition and the prison officials, reference has been made to the 1962 con-
ference of behaviorists and prison officials. One of the individuals who
presented a paper at that conference was Dr. Edgar H. Schein. Dr.
Schein advocated the use of brainwashing techniques utilized by the com-
munists during the Korean War6 7 indicating that the use of brainwashing
should not be thought of "in terms of politics, ethics and morals," but
rather in terms of the good effects these techniques could be used to
accomplish.6" His program was put forth to correctional officers in the
following manner:
'My basic argument is this: in order to produce marked change
of behavior and or attitude, it is necessary to weaken, under-
mine, or remove the supports to the old patterns of behavior and
the old attitudes;' this can be done 'either by removing the in-
dividual physically and preventing any communication with
those whom he cares about, or by proving to him that those
whom he respects are not worthy of it and, indeed, should be ac-
tively mistrusted.' 69
One commentator has noted that the Prisoners' Coalition charge,
which was based on a point-by-point comparison of Dr. Shein's paper
with the Asklepieion program at Marion, came to a "plausible" conclu-
sion that the Marion program was an application of Chinese thought
66 The Coalition was able to smuggle a report out of prison which was addressed to the
United Nations Economic and Social Council. According to that report, the first step
in the program is to sever the inmate's ties with all family and friends. He is put
into isolation and deprived of mail and other privileges until he agrees to participate in
the program. Once he agrees, the prisoner is moved to new living quarters where he is
subjected to intense group pressure by the "prisoner thought-reform team." Mitford,
supra note 3, at 18-24.
His emotional, behavioral, and psychic characteristics are studied by the staff
and demiprofessional prisoners to detect vulnerable points of entry to stage
attack-sessions around. Id. at 18.
During these sessions the inmate is worked upon - shouted at, ridiculed, etc. - to weaken
his self-control, to make him emotional and controllable.
It is . . . driven in to him that society, in the guise of its authorities, is looking
out for his best interests and will help [him] if he will only permit it to do so.
Help him [to] be 'reborn' as a highly probable 'winner in the game of life'
. .S .. Id. at 24.
61 See Schein, Man Against Man: Brainwashing, 8 CORRECTIVE PSYCHIATRY & J. OF
SOCIAL THERAPY, 90 (1962). It should be noted that Dr. Schein, in a letter to HARPER'S
MAGAZINE, Nov. 1973 at 128, contends that he did not advocate these techniques, but
merely described them. Portions of the letter are reprinted in Psychiatric Violence,
supra note 19, at 629 n.135, where it is convincingly argued that Schein did in fact
advocate such techniques. The commentator concludes: "Although the present writer
is relieved to learn that a distinguished psychologist wishes to take a clear stand against
use of Chinese-type thought reform methods in American prisons in 1973, he is unable
to find any evidence that Dr. Schein took a merely neutral stand in 1972." Id.
8 Id.
B Mitford, supra note 3, at 18. Compare this view with the account given by the prison-
ers, summarized supra note 66.
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reform.70  While he drew no conclusion as to the correctness of the alle-
gations, he found it significant that in testimony before a congressional
committee, Dr. Groder, Program Coordinator of the Federal Bureau of
Prisons, made no attempt to refute the charges.7
Further, the same commentator's analysis of Dr. Groder's written de-
scription of Asklepieion led him to conclude that it was clear that
the very ambitious aims of Chinese thought reform - to 'un-
freeze' the prisoner's former organization of beliefs about him-
self (i.e., to degrade his self-concept, to shatter his personal
identity), to 'change' his personality, and to 'refreeze' the new
beliefs into his new personality - are included in the Asklepieion
program.72 (Footnotes omitted.)
While Dr. Groder maintains that these ends can be obtained with less
drastic and violent methods than those used by the Chinese, it seems
evident that his program lends itself to "distortion into Chinese-style,
violent verbal assaults . . . and if restraints are loosened, to violent
physical assaults as well. '73  Indeed, one such incident has already oc-
curred in a similar program.74  Nor can much hope be held out that the
prison authorities involved will use self-restraint.75
A third approach to behavior modification in the Federal Prison sys-
tem is the controversial START program which was first utilized in the
Medical Center for Federal Prisoners at Springfield, Missouri. 76  START
began in October of 1972 as a "demonstration project"77 designed to
70 Psychiatric Violence, supra note 19, at 630.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 631.
73 Id.
" For an account of this occurrence see Psychiatric Violence, supra note 19, at 631.
7- Consider, for example, the following account of the START program at Springfield:
The START program prohibits prisoners from expressing opinions when, in the
guards' judgment, 'such expression interferes with the orderly operation of the
program.' On February 3, 1973, Albert Gagne attempted to return legal papers
to Edward Sanchez. A guard, perhaps conscious that such papers could indeed
interfere 'with the orderly operation of the program' ordered Gagne not to return
Sanchez's papers. Gagne did not comply, and he alleges that when he walked
a few steps further he was seized and beaten by four guards, thrown into his cell
and teargassed while inside. According to his affidavit, he and four other pri-
soners who verbally protested these proceedings 'were then placed on our
stomachs with feet shackled to the bed frame and hands handcuffed behind our
backs. We remained shackled until Monday, February 5, 1973. During this
period I refused to eat because I would have been forced to eat dog-style.
Additionally, I was forced, because of the refusal of the guards to release me,
even for short periods, to void my bodily wastes upon myself, the bed and floor.'
(Footnotes omitted.) Id. at 637-38.
76 REPORT, supra note 7, at 1. In light of the controversy generated by the START program
it seems worth considering whether the subcommittee's statement that it visited the
Medical Center "because the problems and conditions existing there seemed to be
typical," is actually true, or only political justification for the publications of the results
of their inquiry. Id.
77 Hearings, supra note 7, at 5.
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deal with "those few, but highly aggressive and assaultive, inmates who
are found in any correctional institution .... 78 According to Dr. Carl-
son, the program is a system of positive rewards, under which the "of-
fender" is granted more privileges as he attains "a higher level by his
adjustment. '" 79
In spite of the controversy these programs have generated,"0 and the
fact that many of the programs involved have been suspended, Dr. Nor-
man Carlson has stated that the Bureau of Prisons has "no plans to dis-
continue the use of behavioral modification techniques ... "81 While
Dr. Carlson disaffirmed any intention to begin other START programs
when he was before the committee of the House of Representatives, 2 he
has been quoted elsewhere as having said: "We're going to start pro-
grams in all of our penetentiaries' segregation units. Only they won't
have titles that carry such emotion. '"8 3
In the fall of 1974, the Bureau opened the Federal Correctional Re-
search Center at Butner, North Carolina. The Center was originally
named the United States Behavioral Research Center but this name was
changed on the ground that it was misleading.8 4  Nevertheless, the insti-
78 Id. The program was applied only to those offenders who met the following criteria:
1. Will have shown repeated inability to adjust to regular institutional programs
- not just minor offenses;
2. While he may have an escape history, will have repeatedly displayed other
maladaptive behavior;
3. In terms of personality characteristics, will be aggressive, manipulative,
resistive to authority, et cetera;
4. Will have had experience in an adult penitentiary;
5. Will be transferred from a sending institution's segregation unit;
6. Generally, will have a minimum of 2 years remaining on sentence;
7. Will not be overtly psychotic (such individuals are appropriate referrals to
the medical center's psychiatric program); and
8. Will not have participated in START program previously. Id.
Overall 99 offenders were given consideration for the START program. Applying these
criteria, 26 were selected, but four were later removed "when it became evident that
they did not meet the selection criteria." Id. at 5-6.
71 Id. at 5. The program at Springfield is said to consist of at least four levels. At the
first level the inmate is allowed out of his cell for only two hours a week - for exercise
and twice a week for showers. The remaining time he simply sits in his 6 x 10 foot cell,
locked behind the steel door whose small window may be covered with paper to black
out all light. In one case it was alleged that an inmate was kept in segregated con-
finement for 42 straight days with his window covered. Id. at 10. After twenty
consecutive "good days" the inmate is promoted to the second level where he is
allowed to eat his meals out of the cell, enjoy one and one-half hours of recreation, and
to work three hours a day. As his behavior improves he earns additional privileges and
finally may reach the fourth level - "graduation" back into the ranks of the general
prison population. For a more detailed account of the program - especially concerning
limitations on access to religious services, reading material, freedom of expression, and
a description of continuous surveillance and the search and seizure procedures - see
generally Clonce v. Richardson, 379 F. Supp. 338 (W.D. Mo. 1974). A similar hierarchy
of promotions was used at the Federal Penitentiary at Marion, Psychiatric Violence,
supra note 19, at 636-37.
0 See note 7 supra.
8' Hearings, supra note 7, at 56.
82 Id.
83 TIME MAGAZINE, March 11, 1974, at 75.
14 Hearings, supra note 7, at 48.
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tution still plans to include the "Behavior Research Unit" which will be
designed to house approximately 200 prisoners.85 The programs to be
run in the Behavior Research Unit will include one based upon the con-
troversial program at Marion, and the warden of the Center will be Dr.
Martin Groder who was in charge of the Marion program.s
The Center is to have a twofold mission: to treat and diagnose the
mental disorders of offenders as well as to test and evaluate programs
aimed at improving correctional effectiveness. 7 Furthermore, Butner is
only the first such institution to be constructed. The Bureau's plans
include at least several of these facilities, including additional ones on
the West Coast and one in the Midwest to serve the needs of offenders
in those parts of the country."8
It can therefore be concluded that behavior modification has been
utilized in a variety of forms both in state and federal prisons. In spite
of the controversy, both state and federal officials seem intent upon pur-
suing new and more expansive programs of behavior control. It there-
fore becomes important to consider the social and legal consequences of
pursuing such programs.
II. LEGAL PROTECTIONS
Because the use of behavior modification has been so widespread,
and because the ultimate effects which are attributed to it are so great,
public controversy over its use has been heated to say the least. The
result has been a continuing debate - a professional battle between law-
yer and psychiatrist, congressional investigations, law suits, proposed
legislation, and a ban on the use of federal funds to support such pro-
grams.
To put this controversy in proper perspective, it must be remembered
that in large part the continuing debate concerns only what should be -
not what is. The role of the behaviorists and the use of behavior
modification is firmly limited and defined by the current legal system.
To the extent that there have been abuses it is because these limits have
been overstepped. But those legal protections still exist and with enforce-
ment provide adequate protections against the abuses charged to the be-
haviorists.
The first of these protections is substantive: it is derived from the
first amendment and limits the use of behavior modification to certain
small groups of individuals. The second protection is procedural: it
is derived from due process and the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment and is designed to insure that no one is wrongfully
forced to participate in behavior modification against their will. The
third protection is also substantive: it is derived from the eighth amend-
85 Id.
86 Id.
8' Carlson, Hearings, supra note 7, at 7.
"I Id. at 15.
[Vol. 24:422
13Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1975
BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION
ment and protects those whose behavior is to be modified by prohibiting
certain forms of behavior modification.
A. The Rights Against Involuntary Treatment
Many federal prison officials and behaviorists take the position that
once an inmate has been committed to their care they have unlimited
discretion to determine how that inmate will spend his period of confine-
ment. In the view of Roy Gerard, Assistant Director of United States
prisons, involvement in behavior modification programs is "part of the
consequence of committing a crime. You've automatically volunteered.
.. 9 Similarly, one advocate of behavior modification in prisons
brushed aside the consideration of any constitutional protection by con-
cluding that it should be assumed that
a felony was clear evidence that the criminal had somehow ac-
quired full-blown neurosis and needed to be cured, not punished.
• . . We'd probably have to restructure his entire personality °
Unfortunately - or fortunately - the issues cannot be settled in such
an easy manner. One of the fundamental objections to the use of be-
havior modification is that although the clinical language may speak of
behavior, the processes used are really designed to alter the ability of the
individual to formulate his own alternatives. 9' The goal may well be to
control "behavior," but the key to that control is the mental process. By
associating certain physical conditions with the mental activity, or by
putting so much stress upon the nervous system as to make it possible
to remold the thinking process, behavior controllers have and continue to
"tinker with the mind."92  The concepts of free will, individual inde-
pendence, and mental integrity are a basic part of the heritage and phi-
losophy upon which our society is based. Thus, these values are protected
by numerous and overlapping constitutional protections. The most im-
portant of these protections is based upon the first amendment right to
free expression9 3 and the rather ubiquitous right to privacy, both of which
provide a separate and independent right against involuntary treat-
ment.9 4
" TIME MAGAZINE, March 11, 1974, at 74.
10 Mitford, supra note 3, at 25.
9 Heldman, Social Psychology Versus the First Amendment Freedoms, Due Process
Liberty, and Limited Government, 4 CUMB.-SAM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Heldman].
12 Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877, 878 (9th Cir. 1973). Conditioning, supra note 14,
at 635-36 quoting A. MATrocs & C. JEW, ASSESSMENT OF AN AVERSIVE TREATMENT
PROGRAM WITH EXTREME ACTING-OuT PATIENTS IN A PSYCHIATRIC FACILITY FOR
CRIMINAL OFFENDERS (unpublished study).
'3 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
94 For a general discussion of the right against treatment see Conditioning, supra note 14,
at 655.
1975]
14https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol24/iss3/5
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
1. The First Amendment and "Mental Integrity"95
The first amendment provides, in part, that "Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or of the right
of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for
redress of grievances." 96  These rights indicate an intention to protect
the freedom of expression that "free men" can generate and this has re-
cently been interpreted to extend to the protection of a mental patient
against psychosurgery. In the widely discussed case of Kaimowitz v.
Department of Mental Health,97 the court found first amendment protec-
tion against the "impermissible tinkering with the mental processes."
98
The rationale was that the freedom to express ideas is meaningless with-
out the freedom to generate ideas.99 This is consistent with the view
that the Constitution attempts to draw lines between governmental and
individual rights and there are some areas which the government simply
cannot invade. The limitations upon government action are instances in
which it is up to the individual to determine, rightly or wrongly, what
is in his own best interests without any interferences from the govern-
ment. For example, in the various privacy cases of the Supreme Court'00
the essence of the decisions is that under our system of government certain
decisions - such as when to start a family by marriage, 101 when to expand
that family by procreation, 0 2 when to limit that family by contracep-
95 See generally Heldman supra note 91; Shapiro, supra note 10, at 253-73.
" U.S. CONST. amend. I.
'7 Civil No. 73-19434-AWV (Wayne County, Mich. Civ. Ct. July 10, 1973). This case is
discussed and its relevant first amendment language quoted in Shapiro, supra note 10,
at 258-59. The opinion itself is summarized at 42 U.S.L.W. 2063 (July 31, 1973). For
a detailed analysis of the case and its implications see Case Comment, Kaimowitz v.
Department of Mental Health: A Right to be Free From Experimental Psychosurgery?
54 B.U.L.REV. 301 (1974).
98 This phrase was first used in Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877, 878 (9th Cir. 1973)
where the court reversed the district court's decision to dismiss the case for failure to
state a claim, indicating that proof of the alleged use of aversive therapy at Vacaville
"could . . . raise serious constitutional questions respecting cruel and unusual punish-
ment or impermissible tinkering with the mental processes." (Footnotes omitted.) For
the latter proposition the court refered to Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 452 (1972);
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 149-154 (1973).
9 Civil No. 73-19434-AW at 35 (Wayne County, Mich. Civ. Ct. July 10, 1973). Similar
statements appear throughout the opinion, e.g.:
A person's mental processes, the communication of ideas, and the generation
of ideas, come within the ambit of the First Amendment. To the extent that the
First Amendment protects the dissemination of ideas and expression of thoughts,
it equally must protect the individual's right to generate ideas. Id. at 32.
Similarly, in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), the United States Supreme Court
noted that:
Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government
the power to control men's minds . . . . Whatever the power of the state to
control public dissemination of ideas inimical to the public morality, it cannot
constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of controlling a person's
private thought. Id. at 565-66.
100 Cases cited notes 101-05 infra.
101 See generally, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1966).
102 See generally Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942).
[V1ol. 24:422
15Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1975
BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION
tion'03 or abortion, 104 what traditions the family will follow, 0 5 and what
education system it will use for its children' 8 - are all reserved for the
family to make and the government is prohibited from substituting its
own judgment. Since the government is prohibited from regulating the
conduct of family members, it applies a fortiori that it cannot accom-
plish the same end by altering the person's mind.1
07
There are, of course, other examples, but it seems sufficient to con-
clude that the first amendment protection is premised upon the principle
that the individual will be free to generate his own ideas without govern-
ment interference and that such protection excludes governmentally
imposed behavior modification programs.1
0 8
A corollary of the first amendment right to mental integrity is the
existence of a constitutional
limitation on state action which would tend to "establish" any
doctrine or ideology, much as we now have an anti-establish-
ment clause, as well as a free exercise clause, with respect to
religion. 10 9
A very plausable argument can be made that the anti-establishment
clause was applied only to religion." 0 An advocate of such an ideologi-
cal anti-establishment clause finds its roots clearly in the first amend-
ment itself and not as part of an "unenumerated right" under the ninth
amendment."' Support for this position can be found in a variety of de-
cisions which use almost every conceivable constitutional basis to pre-
clude the state from attempting to enforce its opinion." 2 In sum, the
10- Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 461-64 (1972) (White, J., concurring).
104 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-56 (1973).
105 See generally Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164 (1944); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
106 See note 105, supra.
107 See Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) where he
indicates that in matters of privacy affecting family determinations the standard is the
compelling state interest test, but that in the "autonomous control over the development
and expression of one's intellect, interests, tastes, and personality" there can be no
substitution of the state's judgment, even when there is a compelling state interest,
because these rights are "absolute, permitting of no exceptions." Id. at 211.
108 For a more detailed discussion of first amendment arguments see Shapiro, supra note
10, at 255-73. If the "right" is phrased in terms of self-determination, as previously
discussed, and analyzed in terms of privacy, then such protection might also be con-
sidered a "ninth amendment" right. Another first amendment protection may be
offered in the clause dealing with freedom of religion. Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65
(2d Cir. 1971) (a mental patient had the right to refuse psychotropic drugs on the basis
of religious beliefs). Contra, Smith v. Baker, 326 F. Supp. 787 (W.D. Mo. 1970) (allega-
tion that the drug Prolixin had been administered over inmate's religious objection did
not state a claim upon which relief could be granted).
109 Heldman, supra note 91, at 18. The bulk of the author's article is an elaboration upon
this concept. Though Heldman is apparently unconvinced by his own argument, see
generally at 25, this commentator is more easily persuaded.
110 Id. at 35.
HIld.
112 The principal cases cited for this proposition are Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist.,
393 U.S. 503 (1969) where the Court said at 511:
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protection against the establishment of an ideology was set forth by Mr.
Justice Jackson when he identified as one of the highest principles of
our constitutional system the fact that
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox
in politics, nationalism, religion, or matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein."13
2. The Right to Privacy
The Supreme Court has found the roots of a right of privacy in the
first amendment," 4 the fourth and fifth amendments" 5 in the penumbras
of the Bill of Rights," 6 in the ninth amendment," 7 and in the concept
of liberty guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment."' This right of
privacy is essentially the right to exist without governmental interference
- to be able to erect certain sanctuaries, whether they be a home or an
individual's mind, into which the government cannot intrude without con-
sent. In essence, the right of privacy is "the right to be left alone
;,,1l9 a right which has been characterized as "a keystone of our
legal philosophy" and as "one of the most cherished ideas of our form of
democracy."120
The right of privacy has been one basis for the existence of an in-
mate/patient's right against treatment. For example, in Runnels v. Ros-
endale,121 the Ninth Circuit held that a prisoner had a "constitutionally
protected right to be secure in the privacy of one's own body"' 22 when
no consent to surgical treatment had been given and when the state had
not demonstrated a compelling state interest.12 3
In our system students may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only
that which the State chooses to communicate. They may not be confined to the
expression of those sentiments that are officially approved.
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624 (1943); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). See also Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5,
where the court, per Justice Douglas, rejected the "standardization of ideas either by
legislatures, courts, or dominant political or community groups."
113 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
14 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
15 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967);
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
116 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965).
117 Id. at 486-87.
118 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
"9 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) quoted
with approval in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
120 State v. Siegel, 292 A.2d 86, 88 (App. Md. 1972).
121 499 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1974).
122 Id. at 735.
123 Id.
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Similarly the right of privacy has been held to offer protection against
surgical attempts at behavior control, even when it is argued that con-
sent is present. Thus, in Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health121
the court concluded:
There is no privacy more deserving of constitutional protec-
tion than that of one's mind ...
Intrusion into one's intellect, when one is involuntarily de-
tained and subject to the control of institutional authorities, is
an intrusion into one's constitutionally protected right of pri-
vacy. If one is not protected in his thoughts, behavior, person-
ality and identity, then the right of privacy becomes meaning-
less.
125
This concept of "mental privacy" embraces at least two separate con-
cepts. First, the individual is deemed to be secure in the ability to keep
thoughts private. This privacy not only protects the dignity 2 ' of the in-
dividual, but also provides the necessary shield behind which an individ-
ual can assess information,"2 7 experiment with thought, and consider
alternatives necessary to make reasoned decisions. In that aspect the
right of mental privacy has special application to the compulsory be-
havior therapy and control which compel the individual to begin the pro-
cess by revealing all about his thoughts and past life. Since the Supreme
Court indicated that an individual has "the right to be free from state
inquiry into the contents of his library,' 128 it should apply a fortiori
that he should also be free to prevent inquiry into the contents of his
mind, especially when that inquiry is an effort not to acquire facts and
information but rather is an attempt to discover his beliefs, thoughts,
124 Civil No. 73-19434-AW (Wayne County, Mich. Cir. Ct., July 10, 1973).
125 Id. at 38-39; Shapiro, supra note 10, at 226. Compare this view with Runnels v.
Rosendale, 499 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1974), where the court held that a prisoner had a
constitutionally protected right to be secure in the privacy of his body such as would
prevent major surgical procedures without either his consent or a compelling state
interest.
126 Professor Bloustein, in contending that the tort of invasion of privacy is based upon one
overriding principle has argued as follows:
The fundamental fact is that our Western culture defines individuality as
including the right to be free from certain types of intrusions. This measure of
personal isolation and personal control over the conditions of its abandonment is
of the very essence of personal freedom and dignity, is part of what our culture
means by these concepts ....
I contend that the gist of the wrong . .. is not the intentional infliction of
mental distress but rather a blow to human dignity, an assault on human per-
sonality. Eavesdropping and wiretapping, unvanted entry into another's home
may be the occasion and the cause of distress and embarrassment but that is
not what makes the acts of intrusion wrongful. They are wrongful because they
are demeaning of individuality and they are such whether or not they cause
emotional trauma.
Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39
N.Y.U.L.REv. 962, 973-74 (1964).
127 See generally Shapiro, supra note 10, at 274.
121 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
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personality, and character in an effort to remold him. Further, such men-
tal privacy is also beneficial to and necessary for the protection of the
fundamental interest of privacy as it is guaranteed in other areas such as
marriage, procreation, birth control, and other matters of family life.
The second aspect of mental privacy is that the state is prohibited not
only from observing a person's thoughts, but also from tinkering with
them. This aspect is part and parcel of the first amendment concepts of
mental integrity and self determination and is premised upon the belief
that just as the state may not proscribe certain behavior by legislation,
neither may it proscribe the same behavior by thought control.
The importance of these protections - the right under the first amend-
ment to mental integrity and the right of privacy of thought - are that they
provide limitations upon whom behavior control can be exercised. They
offer substantive constitutional protection which prohibits the use of co-
ercive behavior modification on the general population, or even upon
prison inmates without a showing of something more than simply that it
is within their best interests.
There are of course several problems which have not yet been ad-
dressed. One of these is how much must be shown before a prisoner will
be subjected to behavior control against his will. On one hand, the Ninth
Circuit has suggested that the state can overcome the right against treat-
ment only by showing a compelling state interest.12 9 On the other hand,
Justice Douglas, while acknowledging that the compelling state interest
test is the proper one when considering freedom of choice in basic deci-
sions of one's life, adopts an absolutist view in regard to the "autono-
mous control over the development and expression of one's intellect,
interests, tastes, and personality."1 30 Irrespective of which view is taken,
it seems clear that there are substantive constitutional protections for in-
mates' 3' and that coercive behavior control is limited either in its totality
or at least to those who meet certain standards higher than simply being
incarcerated.
3. Procedural Protections
In at least three instances prisoners have invoked the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment to prevent their transfer from pris-
ons to mental institutions without guarantees of the same rights which
protect a citizen from civil commitment, i.e., without a hearing and the
right to present evidence on the issue of the inmate's mental illness and
need for treatment. 32 While early attempts to accomplish the same goal
12 Runnels v. Rosendale, 499 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1974).
130 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
131 There would also be a substantive due process test, at least insofar as the state would
have to show that its action was not arbitrary and capricious and that it was in some way
related to a permissible government objective.
132 Baxstrom v. Herald, 383 U.S. 107 (1966):
For purposes of granting judicial review before a jury of the question whether a
person is mentally ill and in need of institutionalization, there is no conceivable
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under the due process clause were ineffective,13 3 the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Wolff v. McDonnell3 4 indicates that due process rights
are applicable to any prisoner facing any "major change in the conditions
of confinement.' 3 5  Certainly a change from a prison to a mental insti-
tution would be such a change.
One would assume that prison officials would not be allowed to evade
the safeguards established by the Supreme Court simply because they
brought the mental institution to him, rather than vice versa. Indeed, the
language of Wolff seems quite clear and its instruction to penologists is
unmistakable: participation in any mental health program, including any
form of behavior control must begin with procedural protections to deter-
mine that the prisoner should in fact be subjected to such a program. This
was precisely the decision reached by the Federal District Court of
Missouri in Clonce v. Richardson.36  That case involved the START
program at Springfield, Missouri. The court held as a matter of law
that
a prisoner transferred into START, or into a behavior modifica-
tion program like START, which, on the facts, involves a major
change in the conditions of confinement is entitled, at a min-
imum, to the type of hearing required by the Supreme Court's
opinion in Wolff v. McDonnell. 1 7
Further, the court held that such was the law in spite of the argument by
the government that the program was "treatment" and not punishment,
and that it was for the prisoner's benefit. In disregarding that argument,
the court indicated that intent was "not a relevant factor in the determi-
nation of the due process question involved."138
The benefits of such procedural protection were also observed in an-
other "therapeutic" case dealing with juvenile procedures, In re
basis for distinguishing the commitment of a person who is nearing the end of a
penal term from all other commitments. Id. at 112-13.
See also Matthews v. Hardy, 420 F.2d 607 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1010
(1969); United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 847 (1969). For a discussion of these cases and the general considerations in
transfers from criminal to mental institutions see Hart, Prisoner Transfer to Mental
Institutions, Right to Equal Protection, 49 N.D.L.REv. 815 (1973).
133 Hart, supra note 132, at 825.
134 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
135 Id. at 571-72 n.19.
136 379 F. Supp. 338 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
137 Id. at 348.
138 Id. Accord, Negron v. Preiser, 382 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) where the court noted
that the use of isolation cells for punishment was a "serious step" which must be sur-
rounded by due process safeguards and that the "[u]se of seclusion as 'treatment' is, in
this court's view, no less serious a step." Id. at 542. See also the court's opinion at
542 where, when speaking of due process regarding solitary confinement, the court
indicated that "[p]ersons in a treatment setting are entitled to no less." See also
Psychiatric Violence, supra note 19, at 622 where the author concludes that prison
psychiatrists are primarily functionaries of the disciplinary system of prison and conse-
quently their therapies should be subject to the same judicial safeguards as any other
punishment.
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Gault,13 9 in which the Supreme Court noted that good intentions are not
enough and that "unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated,
is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure.' ' 40  Thus, not
only is the number of individuals subject to behavior modification lim-
ited by substantive constitutional protections, but those who are subject
to it are guaranteed normal procedural protections to prevent arbitrary,
discriminatory, or simply mistaken assignment.
4. The Eighth Amendment
Whether in articles and discussion, or in the courtroom, prison offi-
cials and behaviorists alike maintain that their programs are really
"treatment," not punishment, and therefore are neither a concern of the
judicial system nor within the purview of the eighth amendment.' 4 1
While some courts have accepted such sophistry,'4 2 a careful analysis
will reveal that any attempt to differentiate constitutional protections up-
on that basis is naive, if not disingenuous. Constitutional distinctions be-
tween treatment and punishment cannot depend merely upon the label
one attaches to the action. A vengeful execution of an inmate for his vi-
olation of a prohibition against lying would hardly be justified simply
because someone decided to call it treatment, any more than would
the label "administrative penalties" be effective in abolishing safeguards
that normally accompany sentencing.' 43
Any differentiation must rest upon some factual foundation, but the
difference cannot be the consequences of the actions: the vomiting is the
same whether amorophine is used for "treatment" or "punishment" pur-
poses. "IT]he difference between a violent punishment and a medical
treatment lies not in the act itself, but in the intent of the actor."' 4 4 An
139 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
140 Id. at 18.
141 The essence of this argument has been summarized, albeit in a different context, by
Wexler, Therapeutic Justice, 57 MINN.L.REV. 289, 303-04 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Therapeutic Justice].
Where the state's aim is not to punish but to assist by providing therapy, there is
no need for an adversary process because all parties have the best interest of the
deviant at heart. And, the argument continues, the criminal law safeguards have
no place in a therapeutic proceeding, for they serve only to "criminalize" the
process and further stigmatize the subject, and they are simply unnecessary
impediments to achieving the central goal, which is to help the deviant actor.
The most extreme conclusion, of course, is that the entire question is simply a
medical or scientific matter, and that the courts have no business at all meddling
in these need-for-hospitalization decisions.
142 Knecht v. Gillman, No. 72-63-1 (S.D. Iowa 1972) (since treatment was not punishment
it could not be cruel and unusual), rev'd, 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973); Peek v. Ciccone,
288 F. Supp. 336-38 (W.D. Mo. 1968) (allowing injection of Thorazine against the
prisoner's will because it was treatment); In re Owens, No. 70J 21520 (Cook County,
Cir. Ct. Juv. Div., July 9, 1971).
'4 As the court recognized in Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136, 1139 (8th Cir. 1973),
"neither the label which a state places on its own conduct nor even the legitimacy of its
motivation can avoid the applicability of the Federal Constitution."
144 Psychiatric Violence, supra note 19, at 608. "When a medical procedure is done at the
request of a patient and for his benefit, it is a treatment. When the identical procedure
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attempt to make constitutional differentiations on the basis of intent is
specious because the distinction between treatment and punishment,
from an historical perspective, has "lacked meaning from the begin-
ning . . 145
To demonstrate the truth of this proposition it is necessary to consider
the history of the prison movement. The modern prison, with its empha-
sis upon segregation of prisoners, was born only in the early 1800's.146 It
was invented not out of despair but rather "in the exhuberant belief that
it was the ultimate solution to the problem of criminality. 1 47
The hope of the reform movement was that the behavior of the pris-
oners would be modified. It was felt that the prison would become a
"house of penance"' 4 in which prisoners, given sufficient opportunity to
read their Bibles and to think about past sins, would repent.149  It was
thought that solitary confinement would
leave a deeper remembrance of horror on the mind of the cul-
prit . . . . [s]olitude, complete and entire solitude should be
left to do its effectual work. 50
The program of the 19th century reformers parrallels that of the be-
haviorists in many ways. Both seek to isolate prisoners from family,
friends, and news of the outside world in order to prevent interference
with reform programs and the prisoner's progress.' 51 Just as Dr. Skinner
is done against a person's interests or will, it is either a battery, if lacking legal sanction,
or a punishment, if imposed by legal authority." Id.
145 Id. at 619. E.g., the tortures of the Inquisition were rationalized as being solely for the
benefit of the accused. For a convincing argument on this point see Id. at 611.
146 Rothman, The Invention of the Penitentiary, 8 CRIM.L.BULL. 555 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Rothman].
117 Id. at 555.
14s Ford, The Bar's Responsibility for Prison Reform, 34 ALA. LAW. 356, 359 (1973).
149 Id.
150 Schwitzgebel, Limitation on the Coercive Treatment of Offenders, 8 CRIM.L.BuLL.
269-70 (1972), quoting GRAY, PRISON DISCIPUNE IN AMERICA 37 (1847).
151 E.g., Rothman, supra note 146, at 571:
The institutions rigorously attempted to isolate the prisoner both from the
general community and from his fellow inmates. To fulfill the first charge, they
severed almost every tie between the prisoner and his family and friends, and
even attempted with some degree of success to block out reports of outside
events.
New Jersey officials, for example, complained bitterly in 1830 that prisoners
know too much about public events. Convinced that "discipline is interrupted by
a knowledge in the prison, among the convicts, or almost everything that is
done abroad," they unhappily reported that inmates were learning through
newspapers and conversations what was happening at the state capital, espe-
cially in regard to prison matters.
Maine's prison commissioner in this period, future presidential candidate
James Blaine, was also certain that "information upon events of current interest,
and glimpses of the outer world have a tendency to unsettle the convict's mind
and render his [sic] restless and uneasy." Distressed to find magazines and
newspapers circulating in the state's congregate prison, Blaine charged officials
to work still harder at 'separating the convict from all association with the world
at large,' at banishing external influences from the penitentiary. The thick
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assures modern critics that his techniques are interested only in control-
ling behavior and not minds, reformers of the 1800's believed that even if
the prisoner did not become an honest man in prison, at least he would
have "contracted honest habits . , "152
Another similarity is that both groups of reformers believed that their
efforts in prison would have great import for society as a whole. While
the behaviorists may be reluctant to publish their larger goals, those of
the 1800's were not so bashful.
Proponents described the penitentiary as "a grand theatre, for
the trial of all new plans in hygiene and education, in physical
and moral reform." The convict "surrendered body and soul, to
be experimented upon," and the result Boston Prison Discipline
Society insisted, would benefit not only the custodial institu-
tions like almshouses and houses of refuge, but also "would
greatly promote order, seriousness, and purity in large families,
male and female boarding schools and colleges."'5
Similarly, the Reverand James B. Finley, chaplain of the Ohio peniten-
tiary concluded that
[c]ould we all be put on prison fare, for the space of two or
three generations, the world would ultimately be the better for
it. Indeed, should society change places with the prisoners, so
far as habits are concerned, taking to itself the regularity and
temperance and sobriety of a good prison," then the grandiose
goals of peace, right, and Christianity would be furthered. "As
it is," concluded Finley, "taking this world and the next to-
gether . . . the prisoner has the advantage. ' 154
The purpose of this historical diversion is two-fold. First, it demon-
strates that "punishment" has always been thought to be "treat-
ment." ' 55  Second, it also demonstrates that l ehavior modification is
neither an abberation of the correctional system, nor a "revolution" in
treatment. Rather, it is merely a methodological variation of the theme
developed by the 19th century reformers - that men's behavior could be
"modified" by the manipulation of their environment. 156
wells [sic] that surrounded the penitentiary were not only to keep the inmates in,
but the rest of the world out. ld. at 573.
152 Id. at 580.
'5 Id. at 560.
154 Id. at 561, quoting J. FINLEY, MEMORIALS OF PRISON LIFE 41-42 (1851).
155 Thus, even though 19th Century reformers thought that prison life would be "thera-
peutic" in nature, that is, that it would cure the individual, it was still recognized that
the methods of cure were somewhat limited by the eighth amendment's prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment. The same rationale applies with equal force to
modem day cures.
156 As the crime rate continued to rise, it became apparent that the "reform" movement
had failed. The history of prisons has largely been a history of escalation - escalation
of input and escalation of involvement in the prisoner's life. Each new reform may be
seen as an outgrowth of the failure of the preceding reform. It typically responds to
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Further evidence that the distinction between punishment and treat-
ment is spurious is found in the reactions of psychiatrists and prisoners
themselves. One commentator who has examined the role of psychia-
trists in prison - including the attempts to institute behavior modifica-
tion and to use drugs for treatment purposes - has concluded that
psychiatrists are "first and foremost functionaries in the disciplinary
power structure of the prison bureaucracy.'"1,7 Indeed, the psychiatrist
has been labeled the "successor" of "the brutal guard" - "[b]oth men
work toward the same goal: to produce a model prisoner, quiet and pas-
sive, who answers when he is spoken to and does what he is told.""',
This view seems to be confirmed by the prisoners who often refuse to ac-
cept the treatment in good grace, and who have resorted to disturb-
ances,1 59 sit-ins, 160 and have often refused to participate in such pro-
grams at all.
161
Many courts have been quick to recognize that even psychiatric styled
treatment may be punishment. 62  Perhaps the most reasoned opinion is
that of the Ninth Circuit in Knecht v. Gillman,'l 3 where the court traced
the history of litigation under the eighth amendment and concluded that
"the mere characterization of an act as 'treatment' does not insulate it
from eighth amendment scrutiny .... ."164 Noting that the label a state
places on its own conduct does not avoid the applicability of the Federal
Constitution, and that the prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
this frustration by "escalating input," i.e. by devoting more resources to reforming the
prisoner. At the same time this new intensified effort unusually intrudes, to a greater
degree than the last reform upon the prisoner's autonomy and privacy. From this
perspective, behavior modification becomes nothing more than a methodological
variation upon an age-old theme of prisoner rehabilitation.
157 Psychiatric Violence, supra note 19, at 623 citing, Visotsky, Adequacy of Treatment
and Provisions for Methods of Assuring Adequacy of Treatment, in THE MENTALLY ILL
AND THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT, 63 (Morris ed. 1970).
In mental institutions the bureaucratic needs of the institution for passivity,
obedience and submission take precedence over the therapeutic needs of the
patients for development of autonomy, initiative and self-control. Nevertheless,
the therapy-as-punishment "armamentarium" of psychiatry is pressed into
service for the institution's anti-therapeutic purposes: "Obedience to aides and
conformity to the culture of the hospital was rewarded; deviance was punished
through the denial of privileges and through more active sanctions such as
physical punishment, physical restraint, electroshock, hydrotherapy, and transfer
to less desirable areas of the hospital. Id.
' Morgan, Entombed, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1974, § 6 (Magazine), at 21, col. 1. See
also Psychiatric Violence, supra note 19, at 632 in which the commentator classifies
prison psychiatrists into three major roles: the compliant accomplice, naive dupe, and
pressured subordinate.
'9 Stanford, A Model, Clockwork-Orange Prison, N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1972, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 79, col. 1.
160 Id.
161 REPORT, supra note 7, at 10.
162 E.g., Negron v. Preiser, 382 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Nelson v. Heyne, 355
F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ind. 1972). But note the court's rejection of the punishment-
treatment distinction was not accompanied any analytical explanation.
' 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973).
164 Id. at 1139.
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ment has been applied in a variety of different situations, the court con-
cluded that the determination of the applicability of eighth amendment
protection depends upon the facts of the particular case. 6
In the final analysis, the eighth amendment concepts are closely
linked with the first amendment determinations of dignity and self-
determination and as Justice Brennan observed: "[t]he primary principle
is that a punishment must not be so severe as to be degrading to the dig-
nity of human beings."'' 66  The eighth amendment protections thus erect
a substantial barrier against the use of certain types of behavior control.
III. BEHAVIORISM AND THE EXPERT
At the center of much of the controversy over the use of behavior
modification is the role that the expert should play in such a program.
That role is largely defined by the preceeding legal protections which the
individual enjoys. To the degree that there is friction between the advo-
cates and opponents of behavior modification, it results from the attempt
of behaviorists to avoid the legal constraints imposed on their role as sci-
entists versus the opponent's attempt to legally define and limit that role.
In the final analysis the issue is "who shall modify whom, and when."'167
As behavior modification programs exist today, they are largely run
by psychiatrists or psychologists and the "[g]oals of management or staff
are imposed on inmates."'16  The question has been raised by Dr.
Thomas Szasz, Professor of Psychiatry at New York's Upstate Medical
Center, whether such power should be vested in the hands of the psychiat-
ric profession. 16 9 Dr. Szasz answers that question negatively, indicat-
ing that it amounts to an abuse of power and the use of a policy of "de-
fine and rule."'17
0
The response of behaviorists has been that the decision regarding the
proper and effective use of behavior modification is essentially a medi-
cal/psychiatric decision and that cumbersome and restrictive legal con-
siderations should not be allowed to interfere. The general thesis is that
165 Id.
166 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 271 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). "The basic
concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man."
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958). See generally Forman, The Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Prescription: "Evolving Standards of Decency," 19 LOYOLA L.REV. 81
(1973); Granucci, "'Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishment Inflicted:" The Original Mean-
ing, 57 CALIF.L.REv. 839 (1969).
167 Gray, Graubard & Rosenberg, Little Brother Is Changing You, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY,
March 1974, at 42.
'6 N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1974, at 16, col. 1, quoting Dr. Martin Groder of the U.S. Bureau
of Prisons.
19 Stanford, A Model, Clockwork-Orange Prison, N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1972, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 71, col. 2.
170 Id. at col. 3.
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the people with the best data about the best decisions to be
made at this time are the behavioral scientists, not the govern-
ment, and not the image makers on Madison Avenue.' 7'
The argument for behavioral scientists' use oi this decision-making pow-
er thus has at least two bases: an implicit belief that the behaviorist
intends good towards his subject172 and a belief in the expertise of the be-
haviorist to find the best solution.
In regard to the first proposition, it was discovered long ago that evil
as well as good men are well armed with "good intentions."' 173  Indeed,
it has been said that "[t]o do evil a human being must first of all believe
that what he is doing is good .... "174 Such is the strength of this be-
lief that the mere profession of an intent to confer good upon another has
been viewed as a matter of suspicion. 175 Indeed, many of the protections
and limitations contained in the documents of government are designed to
protect citizens against the benevolence of their fellow citizens.
176
171 Heldman, supra note 91, at 12, quoting Dr. A. Jack Turner, Research Director of the
Huntsville Project, Huntsville-Madison County (Alabama), Mental Health Center.
172 Cf. A. HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW VORLD REVISITED 28 (1958):
Who will mount guard over our guardians, who will engineer the engineers? -
the answer is a bland denial that they need an)' supervision. There seems to be a
touching belief among certain Ph.D.'s in sociology [and psychology and psychia-
try] that [they] will never be corrupted by power. Like Sir Galahad's, their
strength is as the strength of ten because their heart is pure - and their heart
is pure because they are scientists and have taken six thousand hours of social
studies.
171 A. SOLZHENITSYN, THE GuLAc ARCHIPELAGO 168, 173 (1974):
If only it were all so simple! If only there were evil people somewhere insidiously
committing evil deeds, and it were necessary only to separate them from the rest
of us and destroy them.
The trouble lies in the way these classic evildoers are pictured. They' recognize
themselves as evildoers, and the)' know their souls are black. And they reason:
'I cannot live unless I do, evil . . . . But no; that's not the way it is!
171 Id. at 173.
Ideology - that is what gives evil-doing its long-sought justification and gives
the evildoer the necessary steadfastness and determination. That is the social
theory which helps' to make his acts seem good instead of bad in his own and
others' eyes, so that he won't hear reproaches and curses but Will receive praise
and honors. That was how the agents of the Inquisition fortified their wills:
by invoking Christianity; the conquerors of foreign lands, by extolling the gran-
deur of their Motherland; the colonizers, by civilization; the Nazis, by race; and
the Jacobins (early and late) by equaly, brotherhood and the happiness of future
generations. Id. at 174.
171 E.g., H. THOREAU, WALDEN 55 (Signet ed. 1964):
If I knew for certain that a man was coming to my house with the conscious
design of doing me good, I should run for my life ... for fear that I should
get some of his good done to me, - some of its virus mingled with my blood.
No, - in this case I would rather suffer evil the natural way.
176 Cf. Senator Sam Ervin, quoted in TIME MAGAZINE, April 16, 1973, at 11:
[Tuhe Constitution was made to guard the people against the dangers of good
intentions. There are men of all ages who mean to govern. They promise to be
good masters, but they mean to be masters. The Constitution was written
primarily to keep the government from being masters of the American people.
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As for expertise, behaviorists have generally misconstrued the nature
of the function which experts fulfill in our society. An expert cannot im-
pose his judgment upon another person, whether that person be a client or
a patient. Whether the "expert" be a corporate attorney advising a client
on merger; a broker analyzing the market; a surgeon prescribing methods
of correcting an injury to the brain; or a behavioral scientist attempting to
cure deviancy; the final decision regarding what action will be taken lies
not with the expert but with the client/patient. The expert's role is lim-
ited to the gathering and analysis of information, to assessing the risks
and probabilities of success, to weighing the benefits against the costs, to
anticipating and planning for the unexpected, and to conveying to the
client/patient his expert opinion and the factual basis it rests upon. But
once this task is accomplished, the role of the expert in decision-making
has come to an end.'77 The course of action is chosen by the layman.
Nor should there be any different system when the subject of behavior
modification is incompetent to make the decision for himself. To the ex-
tent that these principles are followed, the behavioral scientist is ac-
corded the same deference and respect, including the same "freedom
from interference in his field of expertise," as other experts.
Nevertheless, complaints are often made""s that other limitations are
placed upon the actions of the behavioral scientist. These complaints
also are founded upon a misconception of the role of the behaviorist.
Unlike the 1940's when behaviorists were largely ineffective and also
largely left alone, their new role in society - a role which they feel is
too limited by law and social policy - is frequently not one of independent
entrepreneurs in a new social science, but rather officers of the state or
federal government, utilizing government funds and government power to
conduct their research and experimentation, as well as to accomplish their
ends. Indeed, federal money has even been used to popularize their po-
litical beliefs and to offer a rationale to justify techniques which others
have found objectionable.' 7 9
The behaviorist who increased his opportunities for research and for
effectiveness by borrowing the centralizing power of government neces-
sarily comes under the same restraints as others who use government
power. Any other result would be contrary to established governmental
institutions.
177 A. SOLZHENITSYN, THE CANCER WARD 90 (R. Frank transl. 1968):
Why do you assume you have the right to decide for someone else? That's a
fearful right and hardly ever leads to good. You ought to be afraid of it ....
178 See generally Heldman, supra note 91.
179 This was Dr. Skinner's BEYOND FREEaDOM AND DIGNrrY (1971) which was financed
largely through grants from the National Institute of Mental Health of HEW. Id. at 2.
What is most significant is that the book itself contained no new research, nor did it
purport to add any new knowledge or concepts to the scientific data available. Rather,
it was a "political" document in that it sought to iustify and condone increased govern-
mentally conducted behavior control and to offer reasons and rationales as to why that
activity was "morally" permissible.
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We set up government by consent of the governed, and the Bill
of Rights denies those in power any legal opportunity to coerce
that consent. Authority here is to be controlled by public
opinion, not public opinion by authority.8 0
Because of this belief in the necessity of limited government it has tradi-
tionally been considered prima facie immoral for the government to at-
tempt to substitute its judgment for that of its citizens.' 8' This is true
whether the government is acting through the agency of a police officer,
an elected official, a teacher, or a behavioral scientist.
Thus the limitations upon behaviorists stem from two separate prin-
ciples. The first is that the expert's expertise does not extend into the
area of decision-making - an area which is reserved for the layman. The
second is anyone and everyone using the centralizing power of the gov-
ernment is subject to the same legal restrictions generally imposed upon
the use of governmental power. The end product of these propositions is
a society in which individuals, including prison inmates, enjoy both sub-
stantive and procedural protections against the imposition of behavior
modification programs.
IV. FREE WILL AND THE BEHAVIORIST ARGUMENT
The conclusion that significant legal barriers do exist to prevent the
widespread imposition of behavior modification programs in penal in-
stitutions does not end the controversy. The assertion that behaviorists
are currently denied the role they are seeking in order to aid society does
not foreclose discussion of whether those legal protections should be
abandoned in favor of a system closer to that advocated by the behav-
iorists.
In large degree the debate as to what the "policy" toward behavior
modification should be involves two related issues: the morality of the
use of behavior modification against the will of the individual and the
danger of potential abuse.
Insofar as the debate of future policy deals with morality, it begins
with the traditional proposition that American political, legal and social
180 West Virginia St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943). Similarly it has
been suggested that the premise of government that "the people retain the right to alter
the government" has not and should not be reversed to give the government the "right
to alter the people." Heldman, supra note 91, at 34.
's' See generally Therapeutic justice, supra note 141, at 324. Wexler notes that this is
true for a variety of reasons including the belief that:
- the state may not, in fact, know what is best for the individual;
- even if the state does know what is best, it may not be able to improve the
situation;
- it offends one's dignity to have the state meddling in a person's personal
life
Shapiro, supra note 10, at 253 begins with the proposition that "... it is prima facie
(presumptively) immoral for the state to effect substantial changes in a person's
mentation against his will."
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institutions have been based upon a psychology of free will. 8 2 Simply
stated, this premise assumes that individuals can and should exercise
choice concerning meaningful alternatives that exist in their lives and
that any attempt by another individual or the state to substitute its own
judgment would be prima facie immoral as a violation of the right to self-
determination. Under such a view the use of any program of behavior
control without the volitional consent of the individual being modified
or without his continuous ability to withdraw from modification is con-
sidered contrary to normative standards of morality, a violation of limi-
tations imposed by law, and a threat to the foundation upon which the
political system is based.
8 3
Three separate propositions have been advanced in order to demon-
strate the acceptability of behavior modification in the face of the free
will premise. The more academic members of the behavior control ad-
vocates have, at one time or another, argued that the premise of free
will is incorrect; men either are, or are about to be controlled, and be-
havior modification is therefore no more moral or immoral than the cur-
rent system of control. Other advocates of behavior control, principally
those directly connected with penal institutions have avoided the meta-
physics of free will and have chosen instead to emphasize their view-
point that behavior modification programs are not really evil in that they
simply use methods of positive reinforcement. Similarly, it has been
argued that the benefits outweigh any objectionable features.
A. Free Will is Dead
One of the postulates of a certain group of behaviorists is that there
is no free will,'8 4 that every human being is controlled, and that such
182 Therapeutic Justice, supra note 141, at 289. For an interesting discussion of the
free will concept and personal responsibility, see K. MENNINGER, WHATEVER BECAME
OF SIN (1973).
183 But it is true that the issues are difficult to state with clarity.
Since society has been controlling the behavior of the individual throughout
history by providing and preventing opportunities for action and by manipulation
of reward-punishment systems, it does not make much sense to argue that the
control of one individual by another is in itself unethical. It is tempting to say
that certain types of behavior control that are novel, efficient and easily identi-
fied - such as deliberate destructive brain surgery - violate the rights of the
individual, particularly if they are performed against the wishes of that individual
and are irreversible. But this is too easy a solution. Other types of behavior
control, such as confinement behind bars, are carried out against the will of the
individual, and these may also have some irreversible effects.
Quarton, Deliberate Efforts to Control Human Behavior and Modify Personality, 96
DAEDALUS 837, 852 (1967) quoted in Note, Behavior Modification and Other Legal
Imbroglios of Human Experimentation, 52 J. URBAN L. 155, 156 (1974).
184 E.g., B. SKINNER, WALDEN Two 257 (1948: 1967 ed.).
Frazier: I deny that freedom exists at all. I must deny it - or my program would
be absurd. You can't have a science about a subject matter which hops ca-
priciously about. Perhaps we can never prove that man isn't free; it's an
assumption. But the increasing success of a science of behavior makes it more
and more plausible.
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control ultimately rests in the hands of society. 85  Under this view
the choice is not between freedom and control, but rather between a set
of societal controls which are unproductive because they are capricious
and unpredictable and a set of directed controls which would maximize
the benefits both to the individual and society." 6
If it is still possible to live in a controlled society and continue to
value privacy and dignity then one may well prefer the unproductive con-
trol of the invisible hand of society to the visible control of social engi-
neers. Similarly, if society's control is exercised through a multiplicity
of agents (church, government, media) then that fact in and of itself may
offer the individual both sanctity and protection far superior to that pro-
vided by a monolithic set of scientific controllers.8 7
Moreover, the premise that all men are controlled and that behavior
modification can be used to benefit man and society are logically in-
consistent. If all behavior is controlled by environmental and societal
forces and if no men have "free will," then it is impossible for a group
of behavioral scientists to independently determine what is good for so-
ciety and then direct a program designed to steer society in that direc-
tion. On the other hand, if behavioral scientists do have the indepen-
dence and free will to design and implement such a program, then it
must be possible for other people to have similar independence and free
will against which such a program will be imposed.' 8
Cf. [O]ur members are practically always doing what they want to do - what they
"choose" to do - but we see to it that they will want precisely the things which
are best for themselves and the community. Their behavior is determined, yet
they're free. Id. at 296-97.
185 Id. at 105.
Frazier: . . . you have set up certain behavioral processes which will lead the
individual to design his own "good" conduct when the time comes. We call
that sort of thing "self-control." But don't be misled, the control always rests
in the last analysis in the hands of society. Id.
186 See generally B. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNrrY (1971) which devotes much
time and energy to developing this argument.
117 See also von Hirsch, Prediction of Criminal Conduct and Preventive Confinement of
Convicted Persons, 21 BUFFALO L.REV. 717, 747-48 (1972):
Very simply, the law treats man's conduct as autonomous and willed, not
because it is, but because it is desirable to proceed as if it were. It is desirable
because the capacity of the individual human being to live his life in reasonable
freedom from socially imposed external constraints (the only kind with which
the law is concerned) would be fatally impaired unless the law provided a locus
poenitentiae, a point of no return beyond which external constraints may be
imposed but before which the individual is free - not free of whatever compul-
sions determinists tell us he labors under but free of the very specific social
compulsions of the law. (Footnote omitted.)
188 This position seems to be acknowledged by Dr. Skinner in his more recent writings,
for he concludes that a "designer" of a new culture will "[t]o some extent . . . design
a world he likes .... " B. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DlcNrry 164 (1971). The
converse, that such a designer would impose his will upon other men, is also ac-
knowledged in that the inhabitants of the designed society will like that society because
they "have been taught to like it .... ." Id. Another variation upon this theme is that
behavior either can or is about to be effectively controlled, therefore it is "the duty of
our society to attempt actively to control human behavior in such a way as to achieve
the effects we consider desirable before some other group becomes more proficient at
controlling behavior and directing it into paths we consider undesirable." Dr. Skinner,
quoted from G. TAYLOR, TRE BIOLOGICAL TIME BOMB 157 (1968).
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B. Positive Reinforcement
Many of the behavior modification programs are sought to be brought
within a morally acceptable category by indicating that under the criteria
outlined above they represent no threat to free will, since they offer only
positive reinforcement. For example, in defending the START program
Dr. Groder indicates that such programs are
basically humanistic, cooperative ventures which will stand or
fall on their own results and outcome though they can be seen
assuredly as at least doing no harm.18 9
Similarly, Dr. Carlson has said that the Bureau of Prisons "never uses
and does not countenance . . . any . . . form of aversive treatment.
...,190 And again, Dr. Carlson has said that the programs such as
START use "positive rewards for acceptable behavior, not the punish-
ment for negative behavior." 191
But such programs, utilizing "positive reinforcement," are open to
serious criticism because many times the rewards are often "items and
activity that basic principles of dignity - and of law - would demand as a
matter of absolute, non-contingent right."'9 2 Even when this is not the
case, all too often the "rewards" are simply the returning of rights or
privileges which have been taken away upon entry into the behavior
modification program.
The START program provides a good example. Prior to entering the
program the individuals are living in the prison community at large, en-
joying normal prerogatives of prisoners: meals in a dining area with
other prisoners; mail from friends and relatives; access to library facil-
ities; perhaps work programs; certainly some form of recreation; and
other such amenities of prison life. An infraction occurs - perhaps one
of many in a long history of infractions - and the inmate is selected for
the START program. But Dr. Carlson does not seek out the inmate and
tell him that if he can adjust his behavior he will give him "positive
reinforcement" perhaps in the form of a color television in his cell, or
some other luxury. Rather, Dr. Carlson would throw the man into soli-
tary confinement, 93 deprive him of all the normalities of life to which
189 Hearings, supra note 7, at 13.
190 Id. at 66.
191 Id. at 62.
192 Therapeutic Justice, supra note 141, at 297.
During this time, the patient learns that his meals, his bed, his toilet articles,
and his clothes no longer are freely given him. He must pay for these with
tokens .... These tokens pay for all those things normally furnished and often
taken for granted .... it costs one token to be permitted to go to bed, one
token for a meal.
Id. at 298, quoting from Bruce, Tokens for Recovery, 66 AM.J. NUnSINC 1799, 1800-01
(1966).
193 According to Opton, the base from which the START program began was "a base of
privation that goes beyond that permitted under the Bureau of Prison's regulations
.. But such conditions were tolerated because the regulations applied only to
punishment, not treatment. Psychiatric Violence, supra note 19, at 637.
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every other prisoner is entitled, and indicate to the prisoner, in no un-
certain terms, that he would rot in that darkened, 4 by 6 cell unless he
comes to his senses and agrees to volunteer for a program which will
"make him a winner in the game of life."' 94  Though such conduct may
not be aversive therapy in its clinical meaning, it is most certainly not
positive reinforcement.
C. Beneficial Results
A third justification for the use of behavior modification is that it
produces results - it cures inmates. Dr. James Bennett, one time Direc-
tor of the United States Bureau of Prisons, has supported the use of be-
havior modification under the following rationale: "[ilf it could be
shown empirically that hitting an inmate on the head with a hammer
would cure him, I'd do it."' 95 The assumption which Dr. Bennett and
his successors have made is that behavior modification will be success-
ful in curing inmates of their undesirable behavior and that the benefits
of this cure far outweigh any of the criticisms connected with the treat-
ment. Without considering the ends/means conflict implicit in this view,
there are still important questions about the underlying assumption that
behavior modification programs can be considered successful.
There is, of course, a wealth of literature attesting to the efficacy of
various behavior modification techniques. One may go from specific
examples, such as the classic study where a catatonic schizophrenic who
had been mute for nineteen years was given gum as positive reinforce-
ment and was, at the end of ten weeks, able to verbalize a request, 9 6 to
the more general claim of Professor Davison, President of the Associa-
tion for the Advancement of Behavior Therapy, that
literally thousands of neurotically incapacitated adults - in-
cluding people fearful of driving in cars, flying in planes, enjoy-
ing sexual relations - have been taught to reduce their unwar-
ranted anxieties so that their options about how to live have
been greatly increased. 197
194 See, e.g., Dr. Carlson's testimony, wherein he discusses "hard core" prisoners who do
not want rehabilitation. "[Tlhese 10 wolves, so to speak, may, 6 months or a year
from now, or 2 or 3 years from now, get tired of that, decide that perhps this has been a
waste of their life, and a waste of their energy . . ." Hearings, supra note 7, at 61.
195 Mitford, supra note 3, at 30. Of course even this would raise a further moral issue.
"[I]s there any value . .. in virtuous behavior which is not based on moral effort and
moral choice?" G. TAYLOR, THE BIOLOGICAL TIME BoMB 132 (1968).
199 See BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION: A SOURCEBOOK FOR PSYCHOLOGY AND EDUCATION 10
(L. Cohen ed. 1971) which summarizes the various journal articles discussing this
experimental success.
1' Clairborne, Behavior Modification and Its Positive Aspects, N.Y. Times, April 28, 1974,
at 13, col. 4. The journalist concludes that there
can be no doubt that this form of behavior modification works, at least some of
the time. Pioneers such as Ivar Lovaas of the University of California at Los
Angeles have taught self-control to children who previously had to be kept in
strait-jackets to prevent them from mutilating themselves. Id. at col. 3.
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Similar results have been reported from within the prison system.
At Patuxent Institution in Maryland, the warden believed that the recidi-
vism rate of 37%, compared with a national average of 80%,19' indi-
cated a high rate of success for their program of "positive reinforce-
ment." Similarly, those administering the Anectine program at Vacaville
claim success, based on the fact that 61% of the participants committed
no proscribed act while in the program and citing a 27% decrease in the
number of infractions of the general institutional rules. 199 Dr. Carlson,
in evaluating the START program at Springfield, Missouri, presented re-
ports indicating that ten of the nineteen participants had successfully
completed the program and had been returned to the regular institutional
program. 20 0
Despite the claimed success, all of these results have been criticized.
When the Patuxent report was presented to the American Psychiatric
Association it was attacked for "methodological deficiencies." 20 1  The
conclusions reached by the staff at Vacaville have also been criticized
and at least one commentator has reached the conclusion that "no valid
inferences can be drawn from this experiment. '" 20 2  Perhaps the most
criticism has been of the START program. In contrast to Dr. Carlson's
reports of success, others were not impressed.20 3  Chairman Kasten-
meier of the House Subcommittee that investigated the program and
visited Springfield concluded that, in the opinion of the Subcommittee,
there was really only "one prime example of a success story. We inter-
viewed the individuals involved, and thought that the others were less
than successful.."20 4 Apparently the inmates had a more strenuous opin-
ion of the program, for they challenged various aspects of it in Sanchez v.
Ciccone.2 5  As part of the investigation in that case the court appointed
three experts to examine the program, two of whom found it studded
with flaws.20 6
One of the major reasons for giving credence to the multitude of
judgments against the success stories presented by the behaviorists is the
traditional lack of objectivity in this type of experimentation and the
methodological deficiencies which often accompany it.201'  It seems
198 Stanford, A Model, Clockwork-Orange Prison, N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1972, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 84, col. 5.
199 Conditioning, supra note 14, at 636-37.
200 Hearings, supra note 7, at 6.
201 Stanford, supra note 198, at 84.
202 Conditioning, supra note 14, at 637.
203 Chairman Kastenmeier, Hearings, supra note 7, at 16.
204 Id. Similarly, in their earlier inquiry, the subcommittee not only found the program
lacking in success but also found "nearly half of [the inmates] refusing to cooperate at
the time of our visit .... To the man, the inmates distrusted and were suspicious of the
program." REPORT, supra note 7, at 10-11.
205 Id. at 11.
101 N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1974, at 16, col. 6. In spite of this criticism Dr. Carlson continued
to defend the program declaring: "The program was not wrong .... I think the
program was successful." Hearings, supra note 7, at 62.
201 See Conditioning, supra note 14, at 620.
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rather curious that the psychiatrists and psychologists who are working on
behavior modification in the prison system have neither made an at-
tempt to conduct a controlled evaluation of their program, nor have
produced any studies on their success by outside, non-related experts.
This fact, in and of itself, should make one cautious in accepting the
claimed successes of the various programs.
But even if the figures for "success" could be accepted, the conclu-
sions to be drawn from such figures would still be open to debate. One
of the factors which seems to permeate the entire behavior modification
program is a strong middle-class bias. Evidence of this is apparent in a
number of different circumstances. For example, in his prepared state-
ment to the House Subcommittee one finds Dr. Groder talking of the
"typical non-thinking tough guy thug .. . 20 and about programs de-
signed "[flor those inmates who specifically avoid thinking . "..."209
He is appalled by the "frighteningly stark" "depth of ignorance" of the
general inmate population 210 and explained to the Subcommittee that
one of the hardest problems is dealing with inmates "whose education
level is such that they have restricted contact with abstract thinking and
multiple option problem solving .... ."211 Equally revealing is his con-
clusion that while most of the inmates have committed what he calls so-
cial suicide,21 2
[s]ome incarcerated individuals, usually those with white-collar,
selective service or other kinds of milder social infractions had
not committed social suicide .... 213
The results cited by Dr. Groder seem to bear the same bias. In
surveying the ten men who had gone through two years in the program
at Marion, Dr. Groder counted eight successes and two failures. 214
The six clinical graduates (i.e., successes who continued in clinical work)
have all made successful adjustment to middle-class cultural norms, and
have become a computer programmer, researcher and administrator;
executive director of a drug treatment halfway house; a training director
for a Marion-type program; a psychiatric assistant; a drug program co-
ordinator for a drug abuse program; and a program administrator for a
narcotic addict rehabilitation program.1 5 Two of the six are out of pris-
on, the other four are still incarcerated. Four of the men were black, the
other two were white. The two nonclinical graduates (i.e., successes who
did not continue in clinical work) were both from definite middle-class
backgrounds: a lawyer and a store owner who had been connected with
208 Hearings, supra note 7, at 34.
209 Id. at 39.
110 Id. at 38.
211 Id. at 39-40.
212 Id. at 24, 38.
213 Id. at 25.
14 Id. at 34.
215 Id. at 35.
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organized crime.216 The program's two failures were both black men
who had been released from prison and had not been re-arrested, but
whom Dr. Goder thought had failed to be cured.211
From these results, two conclusions could be drawn. First, it might
be assumed that the program could be successful only with individuals
who are either middle-class or are aspiring to middle-class values.2 18
Second, it might be assumed that the program was really successful with
no one, but that middle-class oriented individuals have both the finesse
and the willingness to "play the game" with Dr. Groder and his asso-
ciates.2 19 In either case the program would hardly be the type of "suc-
cess" necessary to utilize the ends/means justification. 22°
Whether beneficial results really have been obtained, be it through
positive reinforcement or aversion therapy, and at the possible loss of
"free will" (if it does exist), remains yet to be proved. While the un-
certainty continues the potential for abuse also continues.
V. POTENTIAL FOR ABUSE
Closely related to the issues concerning the morality of the coercive
use of behavior modification is the concern that such a power has been
and would be abused. It is of course true that every activity is subject
to abuse. The advocates of behavior modification have taken this as their
premise and extended their logic to conclude that actual or potential
216 Id.
217 Id.
Id. Compare Therapeutic Justice, supra note 141, at 296:
[T]raditional "talk" psychotherapy ... apparently works well with intelligent
and educated neurotics, but is far from fruitful when used with inarticulate,
lower class deviants.
with Comment, The Impact of the Politicized Prisoner on the Prison System, 4 CUM.-
SAM.L.REv. 486, 497 n. 58 (1974):
[T]he group therapy programs . . . amount to little more than mental rape.
Here the first lesson the inmate with any degree of awareness learns is that he
must invent his "problems".... Naturally, he also learns to scorn the
therapist for his naivete if the therapist is taken in by the sham.
219 Support of the latter view may be drawn from the experiences at the Maryland Institute
for Defective Delinquents at Patuxent. See Stanford, A Model, Clockwork- Orange
Prison, N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1972, § 6 (Magazine), at 71-72. It is often not a change
of heart which will effect a prisoner's release; rather, the only requirement is the vocabu-
lary and abstract reasoning ability to perform in the manner which is pleasing to the
"'trainers."
220 Another important consideration in determining the value of such a program is to
consider from what perspective success is measured. There are of course "failures"
along with the successes and it is not unlikely that the behavior modification technique
may seriously damage such an individual. Similarly, such programs may have signifi-
cant side effects upon all of its participants. For example, most of the positive reinforce-
ment programs begin with solitary confinement and isolation from the outside com-
munity; the end result is not to restore the inmate to society, but only to make him
docile so that he may be returned to the general prison population. In effect, these
programs, like old penal theories, begin with the assumption that -the prisoner's will
and spirit must be broken. If this attempt is successful it may have adverse conse-
quences since it seems likely that "people whose self-esteem (spirit) has been destroyed
and whose will has been broken cannot readily earn a living and make a place for
themselves in the outside world .... ." Psychiatric Violence, supra note 19, at 621.
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abuse does not, in and of itself provide a sufficient reason to scrutinize
and regulate behavior modification programs. But a closer examination
will reveal that such is not the case.
At the outset it must be recognized that there is some difficulty in
determining exactly who should receive the "benefit" of having his be-
havior modified. The conventional answer is that such treatment should
be available to anyone in need of help. But when the object of such
treatment is to produce normality and when the standards of mental health
are based upon majority norms this answer is far from satisfactory.
As Marshall McLuhan and Quentin Fiore have noted in their influen-
tial book The Medium is the Message:
The poet, the artist, the sleuth - whoever sharpens our percep-
tion tends to be anti-social; rarely "well-adjusted," he cannot
go along with currents and trends.22'
Indeed, it is not uncommon for the "great men" of an era to be out of
step with their contemporaries and as Thoreau said, "The greater part of
what my neighbors call good I believe in my soul to be bad .... .222
On first impression the mere potential for abuse might not be consid-
ered disconcerting, especially since each of the major professional orga-
nizations involved in behavior modification has their own code of
ethics to deal with the matter.22 3 It would not be unreasonable to as-
sume that these codes of ethics are promulgated with the interests of the
client/patient in mind and that they exist as a bulwark against potential
221 M. McLUHAN & Q. FIORE, THE MEDIUM IS THE MESSAGE 88 (1967). Further:
A strange bond often exists among antisocial types in their power to see en-
vironments as they really are. This need to interface, to confront environments
with a certain antisocial power, is manifest in the famous story, "The Emperor's
New Clothes." Well-adjusted courtiers, having vested interests, saw the
Emperor as beautifully appointed. The "antisocial" brat, unaccustomed to the
old environment, clearly saw that the Emperor 'ain't got nothin' on.' The new
environment was clearly visible to him.
222 H. THOREAU, WALDEN 12 (Signet ed. 1964).
223 For example, the American Psychological Association has adopted Principle 22, which
provides that:
No psychologist in the employment of or working in collaboration or contract
with a local, state or federal government will embark on or participate in any
project or program involving clients or patients of the psychologist or his em-
ployers which has the implicit or explicit objective of
a. imposing the community's norms or the social values of some particular
groups on the individuals;
b. strengthening any particular group, political party, or social class;
c. strengthening or establishing any doctrine or ideology;
d. enforcing conformity; or
e. fostering the development of a homogenous society.
These and other relevant ethical cannons are reprinted in Lourens, Skinner Versus
Freedom: Concurrence and Dissent, 4 CUM.-SAM.L.REV. 425, 436-39 (1974). See also
Therapeutic Justice, supra note 141, at 317-18 where relevant portions of a "Position
Statement on Involuntary Hospitalization of the Mentally I1l" (prepared by the American
Psychiatric Association) is reprinted. (Note: these protections are procedural, not
substantive.) For a discussion of the major codes of ethics and their effect upon
research activities, see Note, Behavior Modification and Other Legal Imbroglios of Human
Experimentation, 52 J.URBAN L. 155 (1974).
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abuse. But unfortunately this is not the case. The professional self-
policing has not only failed to prevent violations and abuses in treat-
ment,'2 4 but has also failed to provide after-the-fact disapproval when
those ethical systems have been recognized as violated. 25  While this
abuse has a total impact upon the individual client/patient, it also has
a direct impact upon the political system of society as a whole.
Recently the American public has become quite sensitive to the
charges that the Soviet Union has used its mental institutions as care-
takers for its political and intellectual nonconformists. The news media
has presented the view that Soviet scientist Zhores Medvedev was con-
fined in an asylum because he had a split personality which was demon-
strated by the fact that he "expressed . . . the need to combine scientific
work . . . with publicist activities . *...221 Similarly, Aleksandr Solz-
henitsyn was said to have been labeled an "abnormal schizophrenic"
since he sought "only to find sores and cancerous tumors. He notices
nothing positive in . . . society. " 227  The response was one of outrage.
Newspaper editorials decryed the spread of the "Serbsky disease" 2 8 -
so named because of the Moscow Serbsky Institute, which is the mental
health unit to which many alleged political prisoners have been sent.
Further, the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate held hear-
ings concerning psychiatric practice and abuse in the Soviet Union.
229
2124 E.g., The commitment of "hippies" to mental institutions solely because of their uncon-
ventional life style or beliefs, Therapeutic Justice, supra note 141, at 295, citing, In re
Sealy, 218 So. 2d 765 (Fla. App. 1969); Wexler, Scoville, et al., The Administration of
Psychiatric Justice: Theory and Practice in Arizona, 13 Aniz.L.REV. 1, 20 (1971); the
cases of individuals who were committed for "abnormal spending habits" when they
attempted to enjoy their estates rather than pass it on to the heirs, Therapeutic Justice,
supra note 141, at 295, citing, Note, The Disguised Oppression of Involuntary Guardian-
ship: Have the Elderly Freedom to Spend?, 73 YALE L.J. 676 (1964); the young woman
"patient" who was controlled through "aversive stimuli" by shocks from an electric cattle
prod, Psychiatric Violence, supra note 19, at 619 n. 87.
225 Consider the instance of the psychiatrist from California, working as a volunteer in a
Vietnam mental hospital. He found their major problem was a lack of a desire to work.
But it was only after the use of electroconvulsive treatment and eventual threats of total
starvation that he was able to force his already malnourished patients to work as forced
laborers in the vulnerable outposts of the United States Special Forces. Psychiatric
Violence, supra note 19, at 623-24. As one commentator has correctly noted, the true
significance is not that one individual would use force to make mental patients work;
rather, the real significance is in the reaction of other members of the profession and
what that reaction reveals about the standards of ethics and morality. The result was
not censure or sanction, but rather the publication of his article describing his "success"
in the official journal of his professional association. Further, the article was reprinted
in a textbook whose purpose is to illustrate progress in the field of behavior modifica-
tion and to "begin suggesting new tactics for the prevention of behavior problems." Id.
at 624.
221 Exile for Dissenter, TIME MAGAZINE, Aug. 20, 1973, at 37.
227 Morrow, Book Review, TIME MAGAZINE, Jan. 7, 1974, at 80.
225 The Cleveland Press, Nov. 27, 1973, § A, at 8, col. 2: "In all the long dismal annals of
man's cruel repression of other men, there can be few worse crimes."
229 Hearings on Abuse of Psychiatry for Political Repression in the Soviet Union Before
the Senate Subcomm. on Internal Security of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
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Yet similar activities are being conducted in the United States and lit-
tle if any outcry has arisen. While it is true that the liberty and freedom
of the nonconformist and dissenter usually does not depend upon politi-
cal decisions and psychiatric justification, once the individual becomes
an inmate of a mental or penal institution the parallel becomes clear.
The obvious political motivation of behaviorists may be seen in their atti-
tude and action toward the Black Muslims. The Muslims enforce a type
of discipline and morality upon the adherents of their sect which results
in an organized, nonviolent, noncriminal life. By their religious belief
the Muslim's have demonstrated an ability to make the exact type of
"conversion" in an inmate's behavior which behaviorists claim they are
trying to make. But, instead of being warmly received as contributors to
the reduction in crime and recidivism, the Muslims are considered prime
for behavior modification programs.2 30  Obviously the goal is some-
thing more than law abiding prisoners - and that something more is a po-
litical and social outlook which is acceptable and desirable to the behav-
iorists. The end result is that disagreement and conflict are settled not by
argument and persuasion, but by the use of coercive behavior control
techniques.2 3'
The extent to which such factors are fostered and maintained by the
professional organizations of behaviorists is illustrated by the experience
of David Bazelon, Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia. In 1972, Chief Judge Bazelon was appointed
230 See, e.g., comments of Dr. Bennett at text accompanying notes 4-5, supra.
231 Political repression has been closely connected with the use of behavior modification.
Skinner has openly advocated that behavior control techniques be used to "prevent
disaffection or defection." B. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY (1971). The
prisoners at Marion alleged that the program there was targeted against agitators,
suspected militants, writ-writers, and other trouble-makers. Further, the proposed
program of the New England Governors has been criticized by M. Dumont, Assistant
Commissioner for Drug Rehabilitation of the Massachusetts Department of Mental
Health. In that plan, 35% of the men identified as "special offenders" had been so
labeled at least in part because of their political projects. Dumont therefore saw a
"dangerous possibility that political activists, organizers, and protesters in prison will be
seen as special offenders who require massive and highly professional forms of con-
trol." Psychiatric Violence, supra note 19, at 636 n.160, citing, 6 SCIENCE FOR THE
PEOPLE 43 (March 1974). Nor can there be any comfort from the fact that "profes-
sionals," in the role of psychiatrists and psychologists, are involved. Their disciplines
and the use of the damning lable "mental illness" have a long history of political repres-
sion in our own United States. Consider:
* A 19th century doctor advanced the "medical theory" that blacks suffered from
two diseases peculiar to their race: "drapetomania" and "dysaethesia Aethiopis."
"Stripped of medical rhetoric, drapetomania described a syndrome of a Negro
slave escaping from his white master, while dysaethesia Aethiopis described a
slave's behavior in neglecting his work!" Therapeutic Justice, supra note 141, at
295.
* Dr. Benjamin Rush, the "father" of American Psychiatry believed that forms of
insanity included "anarchia" (an excess of passion for liberty) and "revolutiona"
(opposition to the American revolution). Psychiatric Violence, supra note 19, at
611-12.
* Consider also Mark, Sweet, & Ervin, Role of Brain Disease in Riots and Urban
Violence, 201 J.A.M.A. 895 (1967) wherein it is suggested that, in part, urban
riots may have been caused by "brain dysfunctions in the rioters who engaged in
arson, sniping, and physical assault."
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by the Trustees of the American Psychiatric Association to an Ad Hoc
Committee on the Use of Psychiatric Institutions for the Committment of
Political Dissenters. 232  The purpose of the committee was to investi-
gate reports of the misuse of psychiatry emanating from the Soviet Union.
At the suggestion of Chief Judge Bazelon the Trustees of the Association
arranged for funding and hired a team of researchers for an additional
project: an in-depth inquiry into the use of psychiatric discipline in insti-
tutions in our own society. 3 3  At the last minute the APA disbanded
the Ad Hoc Committee, dismissed the researchers, and sent the matter to
another committee for consideration. In the words of Judge Bazelon:
Our committee agreed that what we experienced was the ranks
of organized psychiatry defensively drawing together, there was
to be no scrutiny, even by insiders - even they might be foxes
guarding the henhouse.134
The ultimate result is that abuses of a most serious nature can and do
occur. The good intentions and codes of ethics of the professional asso-
ciations have not provided an adequate set of protections and it therefore
becomes necessary to at least maintain the legal protections as a source
of prohibiting the abuses. 235
VI. WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS
Behavior control does not exist in prison alone. As behaviorists are
fond of pointing out, everyone daily attempts to influence, reinforce, or
change the behavior of other people. Further, the systematic applica-
tion of behavior modification has been applied in society at large not only
in dealing with chronic psychotics,2 36 narcotics addicts, 237 alcoholics 38
and juvenile delinquents, 239 but also in wider contexts such as educa-
tion in the public schools2 40 and even in entire communities through
2:12 Psychiatric Violence, supra note 19, at 639 n.174.
233 Id. quoting from Miller, APA: Psychiatrists Relucant to Analyze Themselves, 181
SCIENCE 246, 248 (1973).
234 Id.
25 This is not intended to say that the psychiatrists or psychologists are in need of regula-
tion by the law any more than any other profession. Rather, it is intended to show that
society cannot allow any profession, no matter how good its intentions are, to become a
law unto itself.
231 Therapeutic Justice, supra note 141, at 298, citing T. AYLLON & N. AZRIN, THE TOKEN
ECONOMY: A MOTIVATIONAL SYSTEM FOR THERAPY AND REHABILITATION (1968).
237 Id., citing Glicksman, Ottomanelli & Cutler, The Earn-Your-Way Credit System: Use
of a Token Economy in Narcotic Rehabilitation, 6 INT'L J. OF THE ADDICTIONS 525
(1971).
231 Id., citing Narrol, Experimental Application of Reinforcement Principles to the Analy-
sis and Treatment of Hospitalized Alcoholics, 28 Q.J. STUDIES ON ALCOHOL 105 (1967).
239 Id., citing Schwitzgebel, Limitations on the Coercive Treatment of Offenders, 8 CRIM.
L.BULL. 267 (1972).
245 Gray, Straubard & Rosenberg, Little Brother Is Changing You, PSYCHOLOCY TODAY,
March 1974, at 42, where it is indicated that one of the authors has been using behavior
modification on an experimental basis in the public school for over nine years.
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social service programs.24
It has been emphasized time and time again that there is a belief that
behaviorism is still in the experimental state of development,2 4 2 and
that it is in the same relative position as was physics in the 1940's.
243  If
this is true then prisons24 4 become even more important as the labora-
tories where extensive experimentation is taking place and from which
the techniques learned in the prisons can be expanded and applied to
society as a whole. It therefore becomes important in what manner pris-
on behavior modification is handled.
Accordingly, certain elements of the controversy over behavior modi-
fication must be put in perspective. Initially, it seems that much of the
controversy is a result of the misconception of behaviorists regarding the
role of an expert in our society. This is not to conclude that behaviorists
are incorrect in regard to what their role should be - even though this
commentator believes that such is the case; rather, it simply means that
as long as the political system of the country continues in its present legal
form the omnipotent position to which behaviorists aspire will be denied
them.
Secondly, the ban on the use of federal funds for behavior modifica-
tion programs was theoretically unnecessary. As the preceeding discus-
sion indicates, there already exist significant safeguards to protect
individual rights. The constitutional protections found in the first
amendment right to mental integrity and the right of mental privacy se-
verely limit the number of individuals upon which behavior modification
can be performed. Due process and equal protection rights establish
procedures which would guarantee fairness and accuracy in determining
those few persons who could be subjected to behavior modification
against their will. And the eighth amendment provides substantial limi-
tations upon the actual forms of behavior modification which could be
used upon those subjected to such a program.
This is not to imply that the behavioral scientists are right in their out-
cry that the termination of federal funds is regressive or anti-
scientific.245 For the use of government funds, both for research and to
pay the salaries of researchers, is government conduct which invokes not
only legal protections designed to prevent the abuse of government
power, but also political accountability under which the people or their
241 For a description of the community wide program at Huntsville-Madison County (Ala-
bama) Mental Health Center, see Heldman, supra note 91, at 9.
242 G. TAYLOR, THE BIOLOGICAL TIME BOMB 20 (1968).
Every science has a natural curve of development. At first it is burdened with
erroneous pre-scientific beliefs and poses its problems wrongly; progress is slow.
A slow gathering of carefully observed facts is the indispensible preliminary
to the forming of generalizations. Then, as insight is obtained, first in one
sub-section, then in another, progress becomes more rapid.
243 Chorover, The Pacification of the Brain, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, May 1974, at 59.
211 And other "'total institutions" such as mental institutions.
245 See such statements which were made by the American Psychological Association upon
learning of the impending ban of the use of federal funds for behavior modification.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1974, at 56, col. 2.
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representatives can decide upon the proper use and purpose of such
funds. It is hardly the same to deny government participation in re-
search as it would be to proscribe all such research itself.
24 6
On the whole the ban seems to provide a needed breathing space.
The unquestioned objectivity of science has been largely discredited, 247
and its neutral results have recently been recognized as sometimes in-
volving greater risks than any conceivable advantage.24  Further, ques-
tions have been raised as to the ability of our society to absorb increasing
units of change.249  The alternatives in dealing with behavior modifica-
tion range from a ban on all "brain modification" to a reaffirmation of the
system which existed prior to the court decisions and the ban on the use
of federal funds. In between are questions of whether experimentation
should be allowed, and if so whether it should be conducted on a piece-
meal basis or under the direction of some master plan. If it is decided
that some form of additional control is necessary then it will have to be
determined whether such controls should limit the research itself or only
the dissemination and application of the findings.2
5 °
Although the various proposed laws25 ' regulating behavior modifi-
cation have much to recommend them, it would seem that we should not
be too anxious to adopt them post haste. With the ban and the constitu-
tional protections currently in existence there is time to prepare a more
thoughtful, reasoned choice. Society now has a chance to engage in an-
ticipatory law: to think out, discuss, and decide the moral and ethical
problems which are a result of behavior modification and to design the
necessary legal system to accomplish the desired goals. Thus, a pre-
packaged set of laws could not be developed, complete with alternatives
for possible future developments. To the extent that problems can be
anticipated and their solution agreed upon, there will not only be less un-
certainty as to our future, but also less chance of unconsciously aban-
doning values and traditions which we hold dear and wish to maintain.
RICHARD L. AYNES
This has been suggested by a number of legislators, both in state and federal govern-
ment.
247 Conditioning, supra note 14, at 620.
248 Restak, Book Review, N.Y. Times, March 31, 1974, at 27, 31.
Scientific advance and its attendant technology only comes about in response
to social constraints and social demands. Ideology not "truth" is the necessary
determinant of scientific directions. Darwinian evolution, for instance, "both
mirrored Darwin's own capitalist society and provided a biological justification
for the continuance of just that capitalism."
See also M. McLUHAN & Q. FIoRE, THE MEDIUM IS THE MESSAGE 24 (1967):
In an electric information environment, minority groups can no longer be con-
tained - ignored. Too many people know too much about each other. Our new
environment compels commitment and participation. We have become ir-
revocably involved with, and responsible for, each other.
249 A. TOFFLER, FUTURE SHOCK (1971).
250 C. TAYLOR, BIOLOGICAL TIME BOMB 24 (1968).
251 These are collected in Shapiro, supra note 10, at 239 n.2 and Apps. I-IV, 339-56. See
also the excellent Therapeutic Bill of Rights proposed by Kittrie, which is reprinted in
Lourens, Skinner Versus Freedom: Concurrence and Dissent, 4 CUM.-SAM.L.REV. 425,
437 n.54 (1974).
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